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Foreword
This volume provides three fascinating case studies of subnational budgeting in Croatia, 
Macedonia, and Ukraine. These studies, together with an excellent cross-country synthe-
sis, will serve as a valuable resource to those in universities, civil society organizations, 
parliaments, and the media who are concerned with improving transparency and ac-
countability in public ﬁnancial management. 
This publication contributes to a growing international movement to improve budget 
transparency and broaden participation in public budgeting. While budgeting has tradi-
tionally been considered the exclusive preserve of the executive branch of government, 
this situation is changing. Over the past ten to ﬁfteen years, researchers and activists, 
together with legislators, auditors-general, and journalists, have been working to bolster 
their own knowledge and capacity to participate eﬀectively in the budget process.   
THE WORLDWIDE GROWTH OF BUDGET WORK
The most impressive growth in budget analysis and advocacy capacity has been in civil 
society. Just a decade ago, only a handful of independent civil society researchers and 
organizations were working to ensure that government budgets are responsive and ac-
countable to the public. Since then, organizations and researchers in more than sixty 
middle- and low-income countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America 
have taken up this work. 
The reasons why civil society researchers and organizations are gravitating to applied 
budget work are not new. The budget has for a long time been vital to the functioning 
of the economy, to anti-poverty and other government policies, and to open decision-
making. What is new is an international environment that is much more conducive to 
transparent and inclusive budgetary processes. 
One major catalyst for budget work has been democratization. Budget work fre-
quently ﬂourishes in countries that are undergoing a democratic transition, since the 
increased government transparency and public participation that generally accompany 
such a transition present greater opportunities for civil society involvement. A second 
catalyst has been the trend toward decentralization that may bring budgets closer to 
communities and make the issues more real to them. 
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As a result of these and other catalysts, a wide range of researchers and groups now 
conduct budget work, from policy-oriented think tanks to membership and commu-
nity-based organizations. Some groups were established speciﬁcally to advance budget 
issues, while others have undertaken budget work to strengthen their existing policy 
and advocacy work. Several researchers and groups have been established or incubated 
within an academic environment, and some groups have been initiated within the 
public sector. 
Budget work has proven to be eﬀective in a wide range of political systems. It has 
ﬂourished within commonwealth and parliamentary systems, despite the inherently 
closed nature of the budget process in these systems, and it has succeeded in presiden-
tial systems as well. Though budget work has taken root most easily in established and 
emerging democracies, it has proven resilient even when faced with an extreme paucity 
of data (as in Mongolia), autocratic regimes (as in Azerbaijan), extensive corruption (as 
in Nigeria), or political turmoil (as in Indonesia). 
An important related observation is that civil society engagement in budgeting 
complements greater independent oversight of the budget by the legislature, media, and 
auditors-general. In fact, a partnership between civil society budget groups and these 
three actors is often the starting point for local independent budget work. 
TASTES OF SUCCESS 
Although the trend is relatively recent, emerging evidence shows clearly that civil society 
engagement can add value to public budgeting in two respects. First, broader engage-
ment by civil society is associated with increased budget awareness and literacy, more 
eﬀective participation by a number of oversight actors, and improved budget trans-
parency. Second, civil society budget work can also lead to enhanced budget systems, 
shifts in pro-poor allocations, and an improvement in the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency 
of expenditure. 
One exciting example of these impacts is the work of Fundar, an NGO based in 
Mexico City. In 2002, Fundar conducted research to hold the government accountable 
to a major policy commitment to reduce rural maternal mortality. Working with a coali-
tion of civil society organizations on reproductive health issues, Fundar determined the 
real costs of eradicating maternal mortality and analyzed actual government spending 
on maternal mortality, contrasting the allocations for maternal and reproductive health 
with other areas of spending and pointing out regional imbalances in the distribution 
of these allocations. 
Together with the coalition, Fundar arranged a series of meetings on maternal mortal-
ity with legislators, including a televised forum in which public oﬃcials took part. Along 
with related work to secure media coverage of maternal mortality, these eﬀorts paid oﬀ. 
xv
The government substantially increased its funding for programs designed to improve 
maternal health, expanding the funding for one such program nearly tenfold.  
Another recent success story comes from Uganda. An NGO coalition called the 
Uganda Debt Network has contributed signiﬁcantly to the country’s anti-corruption 
eﬀorts by training and building a community network to monitor whether government 
and international donor funds intended for anti-poverty programs such as health and 
education are actually delivered. These monitors then present their ﬁndings, includ-
ing any evidence of corruption or mismanagement, to local oﬃcials and community 
members and push for corrective action.   
In a relatively brief time, this initiative has helped to reduce corruption in the ﬂow 
of government resources to schools and hospitals, identify problems in funding to lo-
cal governments, and obtain increased funding for anti-poverty programs. It also has 
led the government to invite civil society groups to participate in its budget planning 
discussions and anti-poverty initiatives.
TWO IMPORTANT CHALLENGES 
Despite the explosive growth of civil society budget work around the world, several 
important challenges remain for the growing movement. The research in this volume 
helps to deepen our knowledge base on two of these challenges.  
First, while strong examples of budget groups exist in Croatia and Poland, budget 
work seems to be growing more slowly in Eastern Europe than in several other devel-
oping and transitional regions. Although many of the preconditions for budget work 
are met in large parts of Eastern Europe, such as the existence of a literate and skilled 
population, several other preconditions remain challenging, such as access to data and 
the development of an active citizenry. Yet, many countries undergoing transition have 
much to learn from the Eastern European experience of transformation, and these studies 
help to build our understanding of the economics and politics of transition. 
Second, while budget work has successfully rooted itself in a wide range of political and 
economic systems, the majority of the work focuses on national rather than subnational 
budgeting issues. There are several reasons for this, including the tendency to centralize 
budget processes and budget reform in national government. However, as decentraliza-
tion gathers steam, it becomes more important and appropriate to focus our energies on 
analyzing and inﬂuencing local government budgeting. As the case studies show, while 
decentralization can complicate the coordination and monitoring of budgets nationally, 
it often creates greater opportunities for citizen and local legislature involvement. 
Not surprisingly, the case studies do not provide easy solutions to these challenges, 
nor do they even provide generic solutions for the three countries covered. But they 
do help us to tease out the speciﬁc dynamics of subnational budgeting in post-central-
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planning environments. Each of the authors also helps us to appreciate the speciﬁcity of 
projects and activities that may help to advance budget transparency and accountability 
within each context. 
Nevertheless, in many other respects, the case studies highlight a set of challenges 
that are all too familiar to budget researchers and activists around the world. Access to 
timely, accessible, and useful information and to formal and informal opportunities to 
participate in the budget process remain the major obstacles to all of our eﬀorts. We need 
to approach the pursuit of improvements in both of these areas as two sides of the same 
coin. Improved information without enhanced capacity and willingness to participate 
is insuﬃcient, as is participation capacity without access to information. Governments 
have a critical role to play in correcting this situation. But, given the long-standing tra-
dition of exclusive and secretive budgeting, the onus is also on researchers and activists 
to take the initiative and break the mould.  
The Open Society Institute’s Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative 
and Katarina Ott deserve our gratitude for producing a much-needed and extremely 
useful publication. Our collective responsibility is to make sure that these materials 
do not simply sit on our bookshelves, but are enlivened through our actions to make 
public budgeting public. 
Warren Krafchik
International Budget Project
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1Making Public Finance Public
Comparing Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine
Katarina Ott
SUMMARY
This chapter is about making public ﬁnance public and it gives a comparative basis 
to the subnational budget watch project that took place in Croatia, Macedonia, and 
Ukraine. It is based on a grant organized and funded by the Local Government and 
Public Service Reform Initiative of the Open Society Institute–Budapest. 
The following questions have informed the structure of this project concerned with 
the disbursal of funds within local government budgets and subsequent monitoring by 
civil society actors like nongovernmental organizations as well as private citizens who 
ideally form into what this project loosely calls the subnational budget watch. In short, 
as its basis, this study asks: (i) Are citizens participating? Does legislation enable them to 
participate? Are there institutional arrangements for participation? (ii) Are budget data 
available, reliable, and timely? Could one compare actual with planned ﬁgures? (iii) Is it 
clear who is accountable for what? Does the executive branch of the government take in 
consideration external auditors’ reports and/or requests from the legislative branch?
Irrespective of the opportunities for participation, of the availability, reliability, 
and timeliness of data, and of the accountability of governments to citizens, all three 
countries show poor participation and understanding of the concepts that support such 
subnational budget watch initiatives that are more substantial in more mature democratic 
models than those present in post-communist transition states. In order to de-alienate 
citizens and to demystify the budget and bring it closer to the populations concerned, 
further research and advocacy is needed. Like this study, it should raise awareness of 
the importance of the transparency of the budget, accountability of governments, and 
the participation of citizens, particularly at lower levels of government. Models and 
action plans vary from the establishment of monitoring committees in Croatia and 
strengthening the independence of budgetary users in Ukraine, to addressing citizens 
with reader-friendly budget guides in Macedonia.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The intention of this chapter is to give a comparative study of subnational budget watch 
in three countries—Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine—based on a one-year project 
organized and funded by the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative 
of the Open Society Institute–Budapest.1 
The countries in this sample face huge democratic deﬁcits, large and entangled 
governments, and inadequate levels of public services, all accompanied by inactive 
populations. During the post-communist transition, it was expected that governments at 
the local and regional levels most likely would become more inﬂuential and that citizens 
would become more aware of the issues and participate at the local level. Simultaneously, 
citizens would begin to engage in the relatively new concept of a subnational budget 
watch. This has yet to happen.
In connection with the above set of problems, this study has sought to ask: (i) Are 
citizens participating? Does the legislation enable them to participate? Are there institu-
tional arrangements for participation? (ii) Are budget data available, reliable, and timely? 
Could one compare actual with planned ﬁgures? (iii) Is it clear who is accountable for 
what? Does the executive branch of the government take in mind external auditors’ 
reports and/or requests from the legislative branch?
This chapter expands brieﬂy on the ﬁndings of the country chapters and more details 
can be found in each chapter respectively.  Irrespective of the opportunities for participa-
tion, of the availability, reliability, and timeliness of data, and of the accountability of 
governments to citizens, all three countries show poor participation and understanding 
of the concepts that support such subnational budget watch initiatives that are more 
substantial in more mature democratic models than those present in post-communist 
transition states. In order to de-alienate citizens and to demystify the budget and bring 
it closer to the populations concerned, further research and advocacy is needed. Like 
this study, it should raise awareness of the importance of the transparency of the budget, 
accountability of governments, and the participation of citizens, particularly at lower 
levels of government. Models and action plans vary from the establishment of monitor-
ing committees in Croatia and strengthening the independence of budgetary users in 
Ukraine, to addressing citizens with reader-friendly budget guides in Macedonia.
The remainder of this chapter will present the problems of establishing a subnational 
budget watch programs on the local level; analyze the similarities and diﬀerences among 
three countries, Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine; establish common problems and 
possible solutions, explain situations, expectations and possible actions in the future; 
and ﬁnally provide some conclusions.
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Box 1.
Budget watch
Budget watch is a relatively new concept. It first requires a definition: Who are the watch-
ers? And what, why, and how do they watch?
 Budget watchers are usually nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations or individuals 
with the mission of promoting transparency or openness of government, its accountability, 
and citizen participation. They usually emphasize that budget is too important a docu-
ment upon which revenues are gathered and public expenditures made to be left to the 
discretion of government bureaucrats and elected representatives. Citizens as taxpayers 
contribute to the government treasury and they should also have a say in the distribution 
of these funds. This is why budget watchers insist on insight into the collection of revenue 
and distribution of expenditures, dealing with issues like equity, fairness, and efficiency. To 
facilitate this process, they insist on the transparency of budget documents and budgetary 
processes and the possibility of citizens to participate therein. The final goal is to achieve 
more accountable government.
 Typical activities of budget watchers include budget analyses and distribution of results 
in form of newsletters, briefs, citizens’ budget guides, and various other publications. They 
also participate in public hearings, public debates, and various lobbying and advocacy 
activities. 
 Budget watchers may aim at general budget transparency, accountability, and par-
ticipation or may specialize in some topics like poverty, education, health, environment, 
or gender. 
 Budget watchers can concentrate their activities on national level of government, but 
more and more they become active at subnational levels as the majority of the issues that 
directly affect the life of citizens like education or welfare are under the competency of 
subnational authorities. 
 Budget watch activities in USA are particularly developed and groups are numerous 
both on the national and state and county levels. International Budget Project (IBP) of the 
Center on Budget Policy and Priorities (CBPP), Washington, D.C., is a leading group in this 
field. There are also very good and active budget watch groups in India (e.g., Center for 
Budget and Policy Studies—CBPS, Bangalore; Developing Initiatives for Social and Human 
Action—DISHA, Ahmedabad), South Africa (Institute for Democracy in South Africa—IDASA, 
Cape Town), or Mexico (Center for Research and Analysis—FUNDAR, Mexico City). However, 
civil society’s engagement in budget watch programs in Europe is still lagging behind. 
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2. THE PROBLEM OF A SUBNATIONAL BUDGET WATCH
The goal of each society should be to have sound, eﬃcient, and equitable public ﬁnances 
in line with the possibilities and needs of that society. To fulﬁll that goal a country needs 
to have a sound public policy. A good public policy requires government accountability 
at all levels. To make government accountable, the basic prerequisite is transparency. 
And who is able to require transparency but citizens? Citizens elect their representatives 
in the legislative and executive branches of the government to make decisions for them. 
But budgets are too important to be left only to elected representatives in governments 
and parliaments or to possible interplays of politicians and interest groups that they 
might represent. This is why citizen participation is needed. Figure 1 presents the sub-
national budget watch circle of actors: public ﬁnances → public policy → government 
accountability → transparency → citizen participation. The arrows could also point 
in the opposite direction, forming a full circle. In the middle of that circle we could 
imagine some representatives of civil society, academe, the media, or in this case our 
three authors trying to inﬂuence all of them. 
Figure 1.
The subnational budget watch circle
In the context of the LGI’s broader agenda, the authors of this volume were asked 
to steer their eﬀorts to foster positive government reform. In this particular case, the 
term government reform could better be broadened to government and social reform. 
A further request was to produce analytical, policy-oriented studies, despite the fact 
Public finance Public policy
Civil society
(e.g. academia, media)
Government 
accountability
Citizen 
participation
Transparency
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that the ﬁeld is not rich in academic literature. Finally, the goal was to present policy 
options and recommendations geared towards the policymaking community in their 
respective countries. 
In the particular context of the subnational budget watch the authors were asked 
to provide models of participation and monitoring for local and regional government 
budgeting. A further request was to create a usable subnational budget watch template by 
synthesizing the lessons of best practices existing in many countries at the national level. 
Again, one must add that while there are literature and relevant case studies about budget 
watch programs at the national level, they are few at the subnational level. The authors 
were also asked to formulate an action plan for generating momentum, highlighting 
issues such as access to reliable and suﬃcient data, the “translation” of budget lines to 
an understandable format, matching the rhetoric of public oﬃcials to the budget lines, 
and examining the role of auditing and oversight, particularly comparing the national 
and subnational players. 
3. COMPARING CROATIA, MACEDONIA, AND UKRAINE
What do theses three countries share? First, they are all post-socialist countries coping 
with problems of transition from a socialist to a market economy and building a demo-
cratic society despite the strong role of the state (private sector share of GDP ranging 
from 60 percent in Croatia to 65 percent in Ukraine and Macedonia), a democratic 
deﬁcit, weak institutions, underdeveloped civil society, and serious economic imbal-
ances, all aggravated by the consequences of war in Croatia and serious political crises 
in Macedonia and Ukraine. Second, all three of them are new countries established after 
the collapse of bigger federations, struggling with developing new states and appropriate 
institutions. Third, all three countries have problems with national minorities. Mac-
edonia has a large Albanian minority (23 percent of the population) and Ukraine has a 
large proportion of Russians (22 percent). Croatia has a considerable Serbian minority 
(around 4.5 percent of the population) and it has problems with the territories that 
went through tremendous changes of population during and after the war in the 1990s. 
These regions in Croatia are now populated by refugees from other areas of Croatia 
and ex-Yugoslavia territories, further complicating the issue. Minorities are important 
in this context because they tend to be highly regionally concentrated, and this might 
cause particular problems in some regions. Roma are also a signiﬁcant minority facing 
the fewest opportunities and most discrimination in all three countries.
What are the diﬀerences among the three countries? Table 1 draws attention to 
the essential data. Croatia and Macedonia are dwarfed by the size and population of 
Ukraine. In terms of the diﬀerence in the absolute and per capita levels of GDP, Ukraine 
has ten times as many citizens as Croatia yet its absolute GDP is only twice the size. 
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While GDP per capita is at similar levels in Macedonia and Ukraine, in Croatia it is 
twice as large. 
Table 1.
Basic facts about Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine
 Croatia Macedonia Ukraine
Population [millions] 4.4 2.0 48.4
Area [1 000 sq. km] 56.5 25.7 603.7
GDP [USD billion], 2004 34.3 5.3 65.0
GDP p.c. in 2004 at current international USD (PPP) 12,336 6,767 6,414
Source: For population and area (Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2006); for GDP (Transition Report 2005).
Third, the countries have diﬀerent types of territorial organization (see Table 2). 
Macedonia has only one tier of subnational government—municipalities (towns, villages 
and communes within the capital city). Croatia has two tiers of government—counties 
plus municipalities (cities and communes). Ukraine has three tiers—regions, counties 
and municipalities (cities, urban districts, urban settlements, and rural councils). The 
average population of a municipality ranging from around 630 in Ukraine to 23,800 
in Macedonia, with Croatia being in the middle with around 3,200. Of course, the 
population per municipality cannot be taken as a vital decentralization indicator (one 
could look into other indicators like the share of central government expenditures 
in total direct expenditures), but it could be indicative of the ability of citizens to 
participate.    
Table 2.
Number of subnational units in Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine
 Level Croatia Macedonia Ukraine
Regional None None 272
County 20 + Zagreb3 None 490
Municipality4 123 cities 
429 communes
33 towns5 
37 villages 
10 communes in 
Skopje
456 cities
188 urban districts
886 urban settlements
28,585 rural councils
Average population 
of a municipality
3,198 23,8006 6337
Source: Adapted from the correspondence with Daskalovski, Maletić, and Slukhai. 
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Finally, irrespective of the ﬁnal outcome of the processes, the three countries are in 
diﬀerent stages regarding EU integration. While Croatia has already started negotiations 
with the EU, Macedonia has candidate status, and Ukraine only has a partnership and 
cooperation agreement and is considered as a possible partner within the European 
Neighborhood Policy. 
The large discrepancy in the size of the countries, in terms of territory and population, 
the diﬀerences in their territorial organization, and to a greater degree, the diﬀerences 
in wealth shown by the absolute and per capita GDP, oﬀer diﬀerent possibilities for 
the patterns of citizen participation. The same might be concluded about the stages of 
the relationship with the EU.  
Another key diﬀerence is that the three authors come from three very diﬀerent 
backgrounds. All three of them engaged in this program because they are genuinely 
interested in promoting budgetary transparency, accountability of government, and 
citizen participation. But Ivana Maletić is an economist employed by the government, 
actually a deputy minister of ﬁnance of the Republic of Croatia, thus representing gov-
ernment itself. Sergii Slukhai, also an economist, is a university professor, representing 
the academic community. Zhidas Daskalovski is a political scientist, belonging to an 
NGO, representing civil society. All these diﬀerences are reﬂected in their topics: Ivana 
Maletić deals with the supervisory and monitoring role of the central government 
and the public in general over the local government units in Croatia; Sergii Slukhai 
researches budgetary oversight and accountability in secondary education in Ukraine; 
and Zhidas Daskalovski analyzes the role of the public in subnational budget monitor-
ing in Macedonia. 
4. COMMON PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
4.1 Common Problems
Despite the various approaches of the authors and the stages of decentralization and 
democratization of their countries, one can discern some common problems that are 
more or less emphasized in all three cases. They may be broadly grouped under the topics 
of an inappropriate or defective legislative and institutional framework, the dominant 
role of government bodies, and the subordinate role of the public. 
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4.1.1 Inappropriate or Defective Legislative and Institutional Framework
Although Ukrainian legislation regulates citizen participation in budget oversight in 
various documents from the constitution to particular laws, the procedures for obtaining 
information about issues of public concern are imprecise. Consequently, it is ques-
tionable whether citizens can exercise their right to inﬂuence public bodies, especially 
regarding budgetary issues at the local level. Ukrainian legislation also does not provide 
a clear framework concerning the eﬀective use of public money, independence of local 
governments and budget users from the central government, and the accountability of 
local governments and budget users to the public.
Within the Macedonian legal framework there is no mention of any possibilities 
for citizens to be involved in the budgetary process. However, the legislature does not 
preclude citizen participation in general. On the contrary, from the constitution to 
various laws, participation of citizens in decisions about common matters is encour-
aged. One can conclude that although legal provisions do not directly provide for the 
possibility for budget participation at the local level (and the national level as well), the 
legal background for it has been ensured indirectly. 
Among three countries Croatia seems to have the best legal basis for citizen par-
ticipation. However, various institutional weaknesses and psychological and cultural 
obstacles result in: a poor supervisory and control environment for eﬀective central 
government, inadequate citizen participation, and slow improvements of government 
accountability. 
An inappropriate or deﬁcient legislative and institutional framework is the most 
repeated topic in all three papers. The situation varies from country to country. Croatia 
has the legal preconditions but lacks the necessary democratic knowledge and tradi-
tion, in addition to psychological and cultural obstacles. Legislation exists in Ukraine 
too, but procedures are wanting and the result is questionable. The worst situation is 
in Macedonia where only an indirect legal background for citizen participation has 
been provided. 
4.1.2 Dominant Role of Government Bodies
The government is dominant in all three countries and may be summarized as: centralism, 
under which all issues of public importance are supposed to be resolved at the national 
level; the strong role of the state, whether at national or local levels, in all aspects of life 
from politics to the economy and social issues; and weak, usually coalition governments 
that have to cope with more pressing issues of daily survival and are often unable to 
fasten on the processes of decentralization and the dismantling the dominant role of 
government bodies. 
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In Ukraine the central government bears most of the responsibility for the delivery 
of public services, including secondary education. Weak popular demand for independ-
ent local authorities and the long-lasting tradition of a centralized state lead to the lack 
of any strong desire to shift more power from the top to the bottom. Even in the rare 
cases of decentralization, the local authorities do not become truly accountable and 
ﬁscally independent. As a consequence transparency that has been greatly improved at 
the national level seems much more problematic at the local level. All these facts con-
tribute to the weakness of the role of the citizens and government dominance, more at 
the national, but indirectly at the local level, too. 
Local governments in Macedonia are hardly prepared to step beyond the former 
regime’s behavior and accept the principles of accountability and transparency. The roles 
and the responsibilities in the management of public ﬁnances are not clear and in these 
circumstances it is diﬃcult to hold the government accountable for budget policy and 
decisions. There are no speciﬁc provisions encoded in law that state clearly that docu-
ments covering the budget should be accessible to interested citizens. A lack of willingness 
and legal pressures for a change enable government bodies to run the show. 
In Croatia the consequences of war, occupation of a third of the country, and huge 
population movements have all been constraints on feeble eﬀorts for decentralization. 
Excessive number of territorial units and, consequently, the ineﬃcient, oversized admin-
istration at several levels of government, plus areas of special national concern, contribute 
to the slow diminishing of the dominant role of government bodies. Numerous hurried 
decisions necessary for eventual EU accession have further enhanced the dominance of 
government bodies, at both the local and the national level. Consequently, despite the 
nominal decentralization, a kind of centralization is actually in place, contributing to 
further “governmentalization” of the country. 
4.1.3 Minor Role of the Public
With the dominating role of government bodies, the minor role of the public logically 
follows. In all three countries, and unfortunately not only in them, information and 
data are missing, the majority of people are alienated from the government budget and 
its process, and there is a strong need to demystify the budget and bring it closer to 
the population. 
In Ukraine, a country with a population of almost ﬁfty million, some vital national 
budget statistics are published once a year, in one hundred copies, and distributed only 
to high-level national authorities, but not to local authorities or citizens. No wonder the 
general public has little involvement in or inﬂuence on budgetary issues like the level of 
school funding, the topic of our study here. The problem lies in the factual formation of 
local budgets that gives no space to public involvement. Local budgets are formed from 
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top down, a virtual replica of the Soviet-type budgeting process when the Communist 
Party made all the decisions instead of citizens. Even today there is no reason for local 
oﬃcials to discuss budgets with the public because they are predetermined by the state. 
It is not that the public is ready or over-demanding either. 
At the moment there are no institutional arrangements for citizen participation in 
Macedonia. Citizens hardly participate in the budgetary process on the subnational level 
and this issue is not on the agenda of citizens’ groups and nongovernmental organizations. 
Citizens are passive and the political culture negatively inﬂuences the direct involvement 
of concerned citizens in the budgetary processes. Even when citizens show some initia-
tive, responses from the local governments are not encouraging.8 In sum, budgetary 
monitoring at the subnational level is very diﬃcult to undertake in practice. 
Croatia faces the problem of willingness more than a lack of possibilities. Its citizens 
are not organized well and they are still passive.9 By contrast, the local media—radio, 
television, newspapers—are very powerful and inﬂuential. Media have been instru-
mental in initiating communication between the public and local governments, trying 
to talk openly about the problems and change the mentality of secrecy. There are also 
more and more local governments, particularly developed and wealthier ones, promot-
ing the publication and distribution of citizens’ budget guides and organizing public 
hearings and open discussions. However, this is not an obligation. Legal weaknesses 
do still exist, like there being no requirements for the public presentation of simpliﬁed 
ﬁnancial reports intelligible to a wider public. This leads to a poor capacity to deal with 
information presented in a complicated way. The existing Association of the Towns and 
Municipalities is also very passive and has only narrow functions. Despite the eﬀorts of 
some local governments and local media, there is still a lack of awareness of the need 
for participation and of changes that can be encouraged.  
Brieﬂy, in Ukraine the top-down, predetermined process of budgeting does not 
give space to public involvement; in Macedonia citizens hardly participate and public 
engagement is not on the agenda of even citizens’ groups; and in Croatia citizens are 
poorly organized and passive, so that, despite the eﬀorts of some local governments and 
local media, the awareness of the need for participation is still rather undeveloped.
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Box 2.
Opening budgets to public understanding and debate
For the purpose of this text it would be interesting to have results from Opening Budgets 
to Public Understanding and Debate, Results from 36 Countries (IBP 2004). Of the three 
countries only Croatia participated, and unfortunately it did not fare well. As some of the 
issues mentioned below have been improved lately, one might expect a better evaluation 
in the results to be published in 2006. Keeping in mind how the other two countries—Mac-
edonia and Ukraine—were ranked substantially worse in other indicators like press freedom, 
corruption, and competitiveness, one cannot have high hopes for their eventual rankings 
if they participated in this comparison of budget transparency.10 
 In the IBP survey, “Croatia’s scores are uneven, indicating mostly positive practices in 
the area of ‘monitoring and evaluation reports,’ but negative or mostly negative practices 
in the other two major categories:  ‘executive budget documents’ and ‘encouraging public 
and legislative involvement.’”
 In the “executive budget documents” category, Croatia scored only 28 percent, well 
below the cross-country average.  The budget provides information on the budget year and 
the prior year, but no historical data or projections beyond the budget year. Its score of 12 
percent in the “comprehensiveness” subcategory indicates that the budget presents little 
or no information in areas such as the macroeconomic forecast upon which the budget is 
based, quasi-fiscal activities, and tax expenditures. 
 In the area of “monitoring and evaluation reports,” the country’s score of 51 percent 
indicates slightly positive practices. The executive releases reports on a monthly basis, but 
does not issue a mid-year review of the budget. Year-end reports by the executive, although 
released in a timely manner, lack the details needed to facilitate comparisons between 
enacted levels and actual outcomes.  
 In the “encouraging public and legislative involvement” category, Croatia fares poorly. 
It provides no information highlighting policy and performance goals—that is, it provides 
no information about who benefits from various programs and how those programs are 
performing—making it difficult to assess how budgetary figures connect to desired out-
comes.  In the other two subcategories—“involvement of the legislature” and “facilitating 
public discourse and understanding”—Croatia does moderately well, with scores of 54 
percent. Although Croatia issues a pre-budget statement, it does not make available a 
non-technical “citizens’ budget” or other supplementary materials that could be used to 
expand public understanding of the budget.
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4.2 Common Solutions
Basic recommendations in this study evolve around improving the participation of 
citizens, the autonomy and responsibility of local governments, and the oversight or 
monitoring capacities of central governments. 
4.2.1 Promoting Participation of Citizens
As customers of public services, and at the same time providers of public money, citi-
zens should be interested in participating in budgetary processes and decision-making. 
Thanks to the legacy of non-democratic regimes, paternalistic and highly centralized 
states, citizens might not be yet aware of their rights and possibilities. Unfortunately, 
they are often also unaware of their obligations. However, one could expect that step-
by-step these ideas might become more pronounced. Works like this one are expected 
to move citizens closer to that goal. Promoting participation of citizens is not an easy 
task. There is no established academic literature, accessing data is diﬃcult, and promot-
ers sometimes even face open hostility. So what can be done?
In Macedonia a number of policy measures to strengthen the role of the civil sector 
in the budgetary oversight of the local governments could be recommended. First, it 
is necessary to have clear provisions in relevant laws guaranteeing citizens permanent 
access to local ﬁnancial information. Second, local governments should be obliged: (i) 
to disseminate budget information, (ii) to organize regular quarterly open sessions and 
special public hearings before adopting key decisions, (iii) to publish income and expense 
statements and balance sheets, (iv) to have a proactive approach to transparency with 
information made available in reports and on websites, (v) to allocate suﬃcient human 
resources to processing information requests, and (vi) to become trained to deal cour-
teously with the public. All that should be stated in relevant laws. For the beginning, 
a lot will be expected from the access to information law (passed in 2005) that might 
beneﬁt citizens. It is expected to make budget monitoring of local governments much 
easier and to directly empower ordinary citizens in their dealings with institutions that 
now seem distant and all too powerful. 
Whether citizens, NGOs, or media, all monitors in Croatia should communicate, be 
involved, ask questions, and actively participate; give concrete suggestions to their local 
governments; expand their working knowledge and ability to understand and compare 
local budgets; and not “vote with their feet” without trying to act and make changes. 
Monitorrs should be involved in all stages of budgetary process. In the preparation stage 
they should participate in decisions about programs. That would enable them to better 
understand local governments’ work and intentions and might ensure better satisfaction 
with the provision of local services. In the execution stage they should monitor and 
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ask for results. This might help to prevent ineﬃcient usages of public funds, frauds, 
and irregularities, and provide budget execution reports for the public. In the ﬁnancial 
reporting stage, they should comment, ask for simplicity, and compare with other local 
units, so as to better understand the situation in the particular local community but 
also in the country as a whole and gather ideas about new possibilities.   
Keeping in mind the low level of inﬂuence of the general public in Ukraine on the 
level of public expenditures, the goal of the policy proposed is to increase the public 
participation in the budget in order to gain more eﬃciency in providing public services. 
The problem cannot be solved just by an additional legal act (on public governance, for 
example), but with a complex policy mix directed mainly at the institutional strength-
ening of public governance. The core mechanism for securing a higher level of public 
inclusion could be the decentralization of educational administration, accompanied 
by a higher level of school self-government and responsibility of unit managers. That 
might mean a new schooling paradigm, devolution of functions from central to local 
governments, more autonomy of budget users, diﬀerent money allocation, and promot-
ing competition among budget users. 
4.2.2 Promoting Autonomy and Responsibility of Local Governments 
It might be concluded that greater autonomy and responsibility of local governments, 
usually connected with higher levels of decentralization, might improve the prerequisites 
for a better subnational budget watch program. 
Achieving clarity of roles and responsibilities in the management of public ﬁnances 
in Macedonia is essential to the citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable 
for budget policy and decisions. One can only hope that after the newest reforms in 
2005 subnational budgets will be drafted with more concern for accountability. The 
country should not be over-centralized and local governments should not be left to deal 
with important municipal issues without recourse to suﬃcient funding. The practice of 
many municipalities of running into debt and even ﬁnding extralegal means to manage 
and fund their work should be stopped. As a result, budget transparency should be an 
issue of concern to local governments, and central authorities should not tolerate the 
state of aﬀairs by reasoning that citizens need their basic local needs ﬁlled. 
As the central government in Ukraine bears most of the responsibility for the deliv-
ery of public services including secondary education, public policy options should be 
developed for enhancing local budget accountability in the education branch. Legislation 
should be revised to increase the independence of budgetary users, in this case educational 
establishments, and also to strengthen the accountability of educational establishments 
and authorities to the public. It could be obtained with the implementation of self-
regulating mechanisms at the school level combined with a normative formula-based 
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approach in the allocation of public moneys. Simultaneously, the elements of competi-
tion among schools should be launched. This could raise not only school cost eﬃciency, 
but also the quality of education. 
The formal 2001 decentralization of government functions in education, health, 
and welfare in Croatia was not followed with the appropriate decentralization of ﬁnanc-
ing. The central government still has to decide whether it wants decentralization of 
both authorities and ﬁnancing, or decentralization of authorities and centralization of 
ﬁnancing. Government should also invest in solving the problems of equalization grants, 
ﬁscal capacity indicators, and shared taxation formulae. The preoccupation with the 
number of local governments is clearly a politically delicate and tough issue to resolve. 
Clear deﬁnition of powers and responsibilities at all levels of government and establish-
ment of stable ﬁnancing mechanisms based on objective criteria could aﬀect greatly the 
autonomy and responsibility of local governments, making them more interested in 
being accountable to citizens. 
4.2.3 Promoting Oversight or Monitoring Capacities of 
  Central Governments 
Decentralization means greater autonomy and responsibilities of local governments, 
but at the same time it requires a strong oversight or monitoring capacities of central 
government. Central government should enable equalized development of local com-
munities and guarantee the appropriate level of public services to all citizens, without 
ﬁnancial diﬃculties. 
As local governments are assumed to perform state functions at the local level, central 
government in Ukraine is mostly interested in controlling local spending decisions. Un-
fortunately, state budgetary oversight is biased towards control of the legality of money 
usage rather than its eﬃciency. For any change in this practice, a redeﬁnition of the role 
of the relevant ministries, in this case of education, is necessary. The relevant ministry 
should be responsible not only for the content of education but also for the budgets 
of the school entities. The ministry should establish departments capable of dealing 
with ﬁnancial analysis and monitoring. Central government should solve the unclear 
processes of the formation and usage of the budgets of educational establishments and 
the ineﬃcient usage of public resources. It should also enhance the usage of alternative 
sources of ﬁnancing, competition among budget users, and free some taxpayers’ money 
by replacing it with private sources. The goal of these changes is to obtain eﬀective 
mechanisms capable of guaranteeing the best possible usage of educational budgets at 
both the macro and the micro level. It could also increase public interest in the issue, 
and consequently public participation in budgetary decisions. 
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There is no eﬀective mechanism for controlling local ﬁnancial management in 
Macedonia and this is why major legal and institutional changes are necessary. If the 
aim is successful ﬁscal decentralization, close monitoring of local budgets (as well as the 
national budget) is necessary. It should prevent the current practices by local governments 
of accumulating debts, owing suppliers of goods and services, and undertaking illegal 
ﬁnancial management practices that currently cannot be easily identiﬁed, even by the 
state audit authorities. Getting rid of the illegal practices and non-payment culture of 
the government could promote a taxpayer culture and consequently positive quid pro 
quo feelings among citizens. 
The absence of active central government involvement in local government activities 
in Croatia is one of obstacles in the way of their further development. It might sound 
contradictory to the previous claims about strong centralization in Croatia, but it could 
also be indicative of the real state of the aﬀairs. Besides enhancing the autonomy and 
responsibilities of local governments, central government should improve external 
monitoring mechanisms and establish procedures for monitoring local governments. 
Thus they can come to understand that, as well as the state audit authorities, the central 
government can also monitor, control, and audit their activities.11 On the local govern-
ment side the emphasis should be on ﬁnancial management, ﬁscal discipline, and eﬃcient 
usage of resources. On the central government side it is necessary to build analytical and 
monitoring capacities. It will of course be diﬃcult, considering the constant problems 
of attracting staﬀ to public administration. But that is another topic. 
5. SITUATION, EXPECTATIONS, AND WHAT COULD BE DONE
Like the majority of other countries in the post-communist transition, the countries in 
our sample—Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine—face huge democratic deﬁcits. They 
are also confronted with large government expenditures and inadequate levels of public 
services, all accompanied by inactive populations. The options are smaller governments, 
meaning a decrease in services; larger governments, with an increase in taxes; or better 
governments, i.e., an increase in eﬀectiveness. Witnessing the slow processes of restruc-
turing of the economies and the health systems, plus the aging of population, one could 
expect that large governments are here to stay, meaning that citizens as taxpayers should 
try to promote other options. 
One could also expect that governments will most likely become more inﬂuential at 
the local and regional levels and that citizens will become more aware of the issues and 
engaged to participate at local levels, and, logically, ultimately begin to actively engage 
in a subnational budget watch program. 
In Table 3 participation, information, and accountability are compared in the three 
countries. Judging from the answers to the set of questions, the situation seems to be 
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the worst in Macedonia and much better in Ukraine and Croatia. Answers to almost 
all questions for Macedonia are negative, while the majority of answers for Croatia and 
Ukraine are positive, even though they usually are accompanied by some disclaimer 
like “but,” “still,” or “yet.” Of course, this evaluation is rather subjective and cannot be 
used for any kind of ranking of the three countries. The most discouraging conclusion 
could be that citizens of all three countries participate: “hardly,” “poorly,” or “on a very 
small scale,” irrespective of the possibilities for participation; the availability, reliability, 
and timeliness of data; and the accountability of governments.
It is obvious that we need action to de-alienate citizens and to demystify the budget 
and bring it closer to the population, and that the action should be based on research 
and advocacy. That is exactly where our case studies ﬁt in. They are expected to raise 
the awareness of the importance of the transparency of the budget, the accountability 
of governments, and the participation of citizens, particularly at lower levels of gov-
ernment. The chapters propose the introduction of new models and action plans for 
participation and monitoring.  
For Croatia, Maletić proposes concrete institutional framework in the form of a 
newly established monitoring committee with representatives of relevant ministries, 
budget users, and citizens (NGOs, local governments associations, media, etc.). She 
also clearly deﬁnes working plans for the committee. A functional committee could 
change the role and the position of citizens in the subnational budget watch program, 
enabling them a formal position within the process. 
Slukhai proposes a practice from New Zealand for Ukraine. In that model, schools 
enjoy a high grade of ﬁscal independence and are required to perform in a ﬁscally 
sound way. The relevant ministry should be deeply involved in ﬁscal issues and should 
not relinquish their management solely to the Ministry of Finance. The model might 
be a good example to prove that decentralization and school autonomy are capable of 
providing not only very good results in the delivery of education, but also of enhancing 
the incentives of citizens for participation in local budgetary issues. 
Bearing in mind the poor possibilities for participation and lack of information and 
accountability in Macedonia, Daskalovski opted for the translation of budget lines to an 
understandable format and for the generation of momentum in the form of a published 
citizens’ budget guide. The intention is to use the experiences of similar publications for 
other countries and to consult experts in the ﬁeld.  A good citizens’ budget guide could 
enable ordinary citizens, as well as politicians and the media, to better understand the 
basics of the budget and the budgetary processes. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS
For citizens budgets are too important to be relinquished to the sole stewardship of 
legislative and executive branches of government. Citizens should try to participate in 
budgetary processes from the very beginning, when governments start preparing the 
budgets, to the ﬁnal stages when governments and auditors report on their execution. 
This chapter tried to explain why citizens should engage their subnational budgets, how 
to do so, and what questions to ask. The subnational level was emphasized because it 
usually provides basic education, health, or welfare services that citizens are particularly 
interested in. Consequently, one might expect citizens to become most easily attracted 
to engagement at the local level. We hope that this chapter will ﬁll a gap in the existing 
literature and give some directions for possible actions of all interested parties—the 
legislative and executive branches of government, public servants, academia, the media, 
NGOs, and citizens. 
Here, we should emphasize the limitations of our conclusions, based as they are 
on the comparison of only three countries. Although they have a lot of issues in com-
mon, these countries are diﬀerent by size, wealth, territorial organization, and their 
current relationship with the EU. The authors of the case studies also have diﬀerent 
backgrounds and approaches. The topic is rather new, comprehensive, experiences from 
other countries are rare, and we cannot claim that the approach taken was the best one. 
Further work would analyze a bigger sample of countries, e.g., a group of ex-Soviet or 
ex-Yugoslavia countries or new EU members and candidate countries. One could also 
concentrate on particular segments, e.g., the role of local assemblies in local budgetary 
decision-making or the eﬀects of the harmonization with the EU on the possibilities 
for citizens’ participation. 
It would also be good to engage as many countries as possible in Opening Budgets to 
Public Understanding and Debate, i.e., the budget transparency index by the International 
Budget Project, which is expected to impact participation and accountability. Of course 
that impact could be looked upon in the opposite way as well, i.e., how participation 
and accountability could aﬀect transparency. Besides a worldwide budget transparency 
index, one could easily imagine a worldwide budget participation index. Such an index 
might make feasible a comparison of citizen participation and enable them to have a 
greater inﬂuence on governments’ decisions concerning revenue collection and public 
services provision. Of course, decisions should be in line with the possibilities and needs 
of these same citizens, their local communities and their countries. 
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ENDNOTES
1 I would like to thank the authors of the country studies—Ivana Maletić, Sergii Slukhai, and 
Zhidas Daskalovski–for their contributions, OSI/LGI for giving me the opportunity to mentor 
the project, and Scott Abrams for both constructive and friendly cooperation since the beginning. 
The editor would also like to thank Ken Davey for his help with the title.
2 Regional level includes 24 oblasts, Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Kyiv City and Sevastopol.
3 As the capital Zagreb has status both of a city and a county. 
4 Basic level of local authority.
5 Towns have more than 3,000 citizens. 
6 The biggest one is Kumanovo with 105,484 citizens and the smallest one is Vraneshtica with 
1,322.
7 In the calculation, the urban districts are excluded in order to avoid double counting.
8 A mayor of one municipality in Macedonia was so irritated by the request of the researcher to 
get a copy of the municipal budget that he asked him, “Would you please leave the room?”
9 The pilot project of our fellow could be taken as the best indicator of the role of the citizens in 
Croatia. She dropped the idea of surveying citizens about budget processes and their openness to 
the public after realizing that a group of colleagues from the pilot who are all experts in the ﬁeld 
were as completely uninformed as citizens. None of them ever saw the budget of the local unit 
in which he/she is living or participated in any of the budget processes in his/her local unit. 
10 If we look at global press freedom ranking, Croatia is 82nd, Macedonia 107th, and Ukraine 123rd. 
All three countries are considered partly free. For comparison, Estonia and Latvia are considered 
free and ranked 24th, the same as the United States (Freedom House 2005). Comparing corrup-
tion perception indices, Croatia is 70th in a group with countries like Burkina Faso and Lesotho; 
Macedonia is 103rd with Gambia, Swaziland, and Yemen; Ukraine 107th with Eritrea, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe. Some of countries in transition are much better ranked, i.e., Estonia 27th and 
Slovenia 31st. (Transparency International 2005). Comparing competitiveness indices, Croatia 
is 62nd, Ukraine 84th, and Macedonia 85th. Some of the best-placed among transition countries 
are Estonia 20th or Slovenia 32nd (World Economic Forum 2005). 
11 None of the respondents in Croatian survey, when asked who monitors the activities of local 
unit, mentioned central government, the Ministry of Finance, or some other ministry. Over 40 
percent of respondents circled the State Audit Oﬃce then followed internal control, local as-
sembly, local budget and ﬁnance committee, etc. 
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Subnational Budget Watch in Croatia: 
Is Anybody There? 
Ivana Maletić
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper is about the supervisory and monitoring role of the central government 
and general public over local government units in Croatia. The analysis presents the 
legal background and present situation regarding budget processes, their openness, and 
transparency. Since most studies in Croatia were done for the central government so far, 
we conducted a survey to analyze the openness of budget processes and mechanisms 
of monitoring and control at the level of local government units. The main ﬁnding 
shows that the lack of institutional and legal framework for a supervisory and control 
environment causes the absence of active central government and public involvement 
in the local government units’ activities and, in addition, creates an obstacle for their 
further development. The author argues that the supervision and monitoring functions 
are imperative if the government wants to improve the decision-making process and 
to increase public conﬁdence in government as well as to increase public participa-
tion in budget processes to achieve better transparency. Since it is not easy to develop 
supervisory and monitoring functions and to build the related structures, a number of 
recommendations, including a working plan and roadmap, are oﬀered. 
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the level of development of budget monitoring in Croatian local 
government units. In addressing this topic, it asks: Are the budget processes at the local 
government units’ level open enough? Is information available in order to ensure citizens’ 
monitoring and participation? Are there institutionally and legally deﬁned elements 
of the supervisory and monitoring functions? Are there control mechanisms? What 
control mechanisms have been established in order to ensure eﬃcient and eﬀective use 
of public ﬁnancial resources? 
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The main results of this paper show that a comprehensive budget watch program 
needs to be supported by legal instruments for communication (open and transparent 
budget processes), monitoring, and control. It is also important to develop and estab-
lish a system of ﬁnancial management and control; to set up the necessary institutions 
and functions; to deﬁne business procedures for all activities and processes, along with 
detailed job descriptions and separations of duties as well as division of responsibilities 
for the staﬀ involved.
The process of decentralization in Croatia has occurred at a very slow pace. One 
of the most signiﬁcant reasons for this was, and still is, the lack of a good monitoring 
system at the central government level. Additionally, communication with citizens is 
very weak and there is no serious information process that can explain to citizens the 
role of the budget and the possibility of their inﬂuence.  
To support this study, a survey was conducted to analyze the openness of the cur-
rent budget processes and mechanisms of monitoring and control at the level of local 
government units. The results are presented in this paper. Among the main ﬁndings we 
can stress that budget processes are not public enough and there is no well developed and 
established relationship between the public and local units. Second, a monitoring and 
control system over local units is very poor. The public practically does not participate 
in the monitoring of budget processes. The monitoring role of the central government 
over the local units is not systematically organized and weak. Factors to consider are legal 
weaknesses and a lack of institutions, matched with a lack of capacity and willingness 
to change the situation. 
The paper ends by proposing a division of roles and responsibilities for central and 
local government as well as for public. Among the number of recommendations would 
be the introduction of long-term planning and program budgeting with set goals and 
objectives. These are the necessary prerequisites for monitoring and evaluating the suc-
cessfulness of budget execution. 
2. BUDGET WATCH PROGRAM IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 
 IN CROATIA—SOMETHING IS LACKING
The Constitution of Croatia and the Local Government Act prescribe that local govern-
ment units have revenues for ﬁnancing expenditures derived from carrying out tasks 
from their scope of work. Local units generate income from their own sources (property 
and local taxes), from shared revenues (shared between the government, municipalities, 
cities, and counties), and from grants (mainly from the central government). 
The ﬁscal decentralization process started in 2001. During this process the central 
government transferred part of its authority and responsibility in ﬁnancing schools, 
healthcare, and social welfare to local units. In the ﬁrst phase of decentralization local 
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units (counties and large cities—total of 53) primarily assumed competence only for 
ﬁnancing material expenses and expenses for the acquisition of non-ﬁnancial assets. 
Parallel with the expenditure, central government transferred the revenues (funds for 
ﬁnancing) by increasing the local governments’ share in income tax and ensured grants 
from the so-called equalization fund for local units. But progress in the decentraliza-
tion process has not taken place during the period of the last four years (everything has 
remained at the ﬁrst phase); one of the main reasons is the lack of a good monitoring 
system at the central government level. Although central and local government have the 
same aim (to provide citizens with necessary services), if the central government does 
not have good information on how the money transferred from the central to local level 
is spent, then it will not take steps to give local government more responsibilities and 
independence. With a good monitoring system, both sides are informed, which leads 
to mutual understanding and, in the end, to further progress. The basic precondition 
for the monitoring system is to have timely, reliable and accurate information. Financial 
information (on a quarterly basis) of all local units and their budget users are available 
in the database in the Ministry of Finance. The whole database is not publicly available, 
but only some parts, such as municipalities, towns, and counties’ reports on revenue 
and expenditures, are published on the Ministry’s website.1  
The central government seeks to ensure macroeconomic stability, which is why it is 
important that local units practice discipline with regard to the set ﬁscal and monetary 
policy. As a means of achieving this objective, the central government has passed legisla-
tion aimed at controlling the borrowing of local units. Since the central government also 
allocates part of its resources to ﬁnancing functions at the local level, it naturally wants 
to ensure that the functions are carried out properly and that the allocated resources are 
used for intended purposes. Still, its monitoring and control role is a very passive: 
 • budgets and ﬁnancial reports are collected without feedback on correctness and 
quality of the data, 
 • limits for borrowing are given but control is performed only when local unit 
submits the request for approval to borrow,
 • ﬁnancing of the decentralized functions is monitored through the reports without 
on-the-spot checks and controls,
 • line-ministries responsible for the decentralized functions must use ﬁnancial 
reports (in addition, they receive quarterly local units’ reports about uses of 
decentralized funds) as a basis for deciding about the criteria and measures to 
insure the minimum ﬁnancial standard for every decentralized function, and 
deﬁne the way the equalization grants for decentralized functions are to be 
calculated. However, there is no review of the actual needs in comparison with 
minimum ﬁnancial standards; of the actual output, including a local unit’s 
co-ﬁnancing, as compared to the ﬁnancial plan; of the progress of a local unit’s 
ability to manage decentralized functions.
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One of the problems at the central government level is deﬁnitely insuﬃcient capac-
ity for building the monitoring system. Monitoring is a management responsibility that 
involves collection, analysis, communication, and the use of information about the 
programs’ progress. It ensures the eﬀectiveness and quality of the programs and periodi-
cally reviews their progress towards the achievements of objectives. 
Communication with citizens is insuﬃcient. Rare are the examples of local units 
that supply their citizens with brochures which explain, in a simple way, what has been 
done within a year and how, and what is planned to be done. There is no example of 
asking citizens about possible changes or new programs. Local units should have in mind 
that the citizens are users of public services and they pay for them (either directly or 
indirectly through the collection of fees and taxes), but they don’t. Prices and qualities 
of the services have to correspond to the citizens’ needs and requirements as taxpayers 
and users of those services. The local units have to contact the citizens, involve them 
in all of the budget processes and try to satisfy their speciﬁc local needs. However, it is 
society’s job to ensure that every individual can actively participate in the government’s 
activities, putting forth questions and expressing satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
level of local services. 
The extent of activity of all interested parties (scientists, NGOs, media, or citizens) 
is best described through the fact that, from the year 2001, ﬁnancial statements of local 
units (summarized data for counties, towns, and municipalities) have not been published 
until September 2005 and nobody asked why.
The participation of the public not only depends on its own eﬀort and interest in 
active involvement in monitoring local units’ performance but also on the openness 
of processes, and willingness of local units to integrate the public into budgetary proc-
esses.
Information is publicly available because of legal obligations. But some local units 
started to understand that communication with the public can help them in performing 
their job better. Without communication it is not possible to have a good monitoring 
system in practice. Communication among all interested parties is a starting point, and 
they have a shared aim—the progress and development of the local units in a sustain-
able, eﬀective, and eﬃcient way. Since the interested parties have diﬀerent approaches 
on how to reach this aim, they presume that they cannot trust each other. A system of 
monitoring and control would alleviate this problem. 
3. SURVEY ABOUT THE OPENNESS OF THE BUDGET PROCESS 
The discussion that follows considers the budget process and its openness to the public 
with regard to how it is implemented in local units. The openness of the budget process 
was probed via the survey questionnaire that accompanied this project (see Annex 6.5).2 
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The questionnaire was intended for the heads of the ﬁnancial divisions in the local 
units and it consisted of two parts: the openness of the budget process and the mecha-
nisms of monitoring and control that insure legal adoption and execution of the budget. 
The aim was to check the openness of the budget processes by testing information that 
is publicly available and by asking about communication methods local units employ 
with their citizens, and to check the mechanisms of monitoring and control over the 
local units themselves.
The survey covered all local government units in Croatia. The questionnaire was sent 
to all of them: 426 municipalities, 123 towns, the city of Zagreb, and 20 counties.
Forty-four percent of the total number ﬁlled it in and sent it back. The ﬁnal number 
of local units that responded was: 141 municipalities (40 percent of total), 61 towns 
(51 percent of total), and 14 counties (70 percent of total), for a total of 216 results. 
The number of local units was deemed satisfactory for the analysis.  
The author’s phone number was given with the questionnaire in case of need for 
additional explanation. Only ﬁve local units called, mainly to express their satisfaction 
with the questions and their hope that the result will be concrete incentives from the 
central government level for developing a system with a clear explanation of what is 
public, who can get what kind of information, and when. 
In most cases the heads of the local unit ﬁnancial departments ﬁlled in the ques-
tionnaire. Many of them circled one or more answers and they also gave a broader 
context with detailed explanations. Though this made for a time-consuming analysis, 
the results are valuable. 
3.1 Budget Preparation
The Ministry of Finance, or for that matter any other ministry and central government 
institution, is not involved in the process of budget preparation at the local units’ level. 
Central government indirectly—through the legal framework—deﬁnes the broader 
context of the budget through the prescribed budget methodology: program budgeting, 
multi-year budget, and level of detail of information.  
The ﬁrst two questions evaluate to what extent the public (citizens, nonproﬁt 
organizations, media, scientists, and other stakeholders) participate in the budget ne-
gotiation process.
A budget draft is publicly available in 71 percent of local units but in a very pas-
sive way because local units do not really try to involve the public in the negotiation 
process.
Figure 1 shows the possibilities of public insight into the budgetary draft.
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Figure 1.
Public insight into the budget draft
In 29 percent of local units the budget draft is not publicly available and the dis-
tribution of given explanation is shown in Figure 2. 
Some of the verbal explanations why budget draft is not publicly available are the 
following:
 • we have discussions with social partners, towns, and municipalities but not with 
the public;
 • the management attitude is that the public is too demanding and because of 
that it is better to avoid it and to prepare the budget alone;
 • it is not practical and there is no time to do it;
 • there is no sense to publish the budget draft. We, for example, send to all 
companies and other business entities in the municipality’s tender for project 
proposals but the interest and response is very low.
According to the Budget Act, Article 32 the adopted budget must be published in 
the local gazette. Because of this legal obligation it was expected that nobody would 
answer NO to the second question (Budget adopted by the assembly is published: Yes/
No) but still 11 percent (two towns and 10 municipalities) answered that the adopted 
budget is not published mainly because: the public is not interested in the budget (the 
budget is too complicated and it is not understandable) and there is no possibility to 
inﬂuence (to change) the budget after its adoption.
One of the explanations why the budget draft is not publicly available was that 
the public is too demanding and that it is better to avoid it. On the other hand, to the 
Website
8%
Local gazette
22%
Open discussion
34%
Ask for in person
36%
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second question answers suggested that the public is not interested. With this attitude 
from side of the local units, the public is in a diﬃcult situation, because in any case, 
interested or not, they will not get the information. This clearly shows that local units 
must not consider who will use the data and how, but must focus on how to present 
their activities and how to communicate with the public. 
Figure 2.
Reasons why the public does not have an insight into the budget draft
As shown in Figure 3, 89 percent of those local governments who publish the 
adopted budget explain the reasons for publishing.
Figure 3.
Reasons for publishing the adopted budget
Against the law
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Based on the answers to the ﬁrst two questions, it is possible to conclude that some 
local units are trying to ﬁnd the mechanisms for communication with the public in 
order to involve it more in the budget negotiation process. Still, there are no procedures 
based on which local units regularly and systematically communicate with the public; 
communication is more ad hoc and depends on the willingness of the both sides. There 
is a certain number of local units that think that the budget preparation and adoption 
is an internal process and that it is too technical an issue for public involvement. 
3.2 Budget Execution
Local units can disperse money to a budget user monthly, weekly, or daily, depending 
on the available level of the ﬁnancial-information system and the relationship with the 
budget user.
The majority of local units transfer the money to the budget users’ bank account 
and have to wait for the information from the budget users about what expenses the 
money has been used for. Local units record only the expenses that are paid but not the 
accrued ones. Another weakness is that data are unreliable and depend on the budget 
users’ feedback. 
The most ideal system would be the highly automated one through which the general 
ledgers of each budget user are connected directly with local unit’s general ledger; here, 
budget users put accounting information (assets and liabilities, revenues and expenses) 
directly into the local unit’s ledger accounts. 
The Budget Act stipulates the obligation of providing semi-annual and annual 
reports on budget execution at the local level. Completed reports are submitted and 
published in the oﬃcial gazettes of local units. If they are not written or made suitable 
for a wider circle of beneﬁciaries, they are self-serving and intended only to satisfy legal 
requirements. 
Discussion about the annual and semi-annual report on budget execution is public in 
79 percent of the local units. The way the discussion about budget execution is publicly 
organized is shown in Figure 4. 
Public satisfaction with the local units’ programs and services is regularly checked 
in 70 percent of local units, mainly through the media: special local radio’ programs 
and supplements in the local newspapers. Some of the local units use public web pages 
with the questionnaires, “coﬀee” with the mayor, a postal box or telephone hotline for 
complaints and suggestions, and meetings with local boards.
The local units that do not check the public attitude and satisfaction with their 
programs and services oﬀer excuses as to why this is the case: there is no special person 
or department entitled to do that job, communication is ad hoc, there is no systematic 
approach, there are time limits and lack of willingness, local units analyze the feedback 
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and like to get the appraisals but they do not react to them, the public does not want 
to communicate, or it is still not aware that it can participate, inﬂuence, and change 
the public environment.
Figure 4.
Organization of the public discussion
 
3.3 Information System
An information system has to give answers to the three basic questions about govern-
ment spending: what the money was spent on, how it was spent, and who spent it. It 
means that the data in the budget system are classiﬁed economically, functionally, and 
organizationally, which is one of the basic requirements for achieving ﬁscal transpar-
ency (IMF 2001). 
The purpose of a uniform accounting methodology and chart of accounts would 
be to develop an analytical framework for ﬁnancial reporting that could be used for 
monitoring and comparing the performance of local units. Annex 6.2 gives an overview 
of the information system—the use of budget classiﬁcations and prescribed reporting 
framework. 
Subnational ﬁscal reporting is a tool for the monitoring process, but in practice the 
information is used mostly by the Ministry of Finance, and even then more for statisti-
cal purposes than for suggesting corrective measures and improvements in the quality 
of work of local units. Other monitors rarely use ﬁnancial reports. 
Public availability of the ﬁnancial reports was measured by the ﬁfth question of 
the questionnaire. Three local units (two municipalities and one town) answered that 
ﬁnancial statements are not for public, and in 24 percent of the cases citizens have to 
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Other
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submit a special request for ﬁnancial information. This shows that the mentality of 
secrecy is still present. The answers are shown on Figure 5. 
Figure 5.
Citizens’ insight into the LGU’s ﬁnancial statements
The sixth question was asked to gauge general management’s attitude towards citizens’ 
participation during the whole budget process (preparation, execution, examination of 
the ﬁnancial statements). Seventy-ﬁve percent of the local units think that public in-
volvement is inevitable because the aim of a local unit’s operations is to satisfy citizens’ 
needs. If citizens are not actively involved in the budget process, then it is not possible 
for the local unit to know if the aim is fulﬁlled and what is necessary to undertake in 
the case of non-fulﬁllment. Even though this question was asked in a suggestive way, 
with an explanation of why the local units need good feedback from citizens, 25 percent 
of the local units answered that there was no need to involve the public in the budget 
processes because the citizens do not have enough knowledge for active participation.
Answers to the questions in the ﬁrst part of the questionnaire describe the level of 
the openness of the budget processes. Local units are aware that the public should be 
informed and try to involve media in all stages of the budget process. Information is 
publicly available, but institutional capacities and activities taken in order to achieve 
active involvement and communication with the public are still very poor.  
 
3.4 Monitoring and Control Mechanisms 
After the budget adoption, the assembly monitors and controls the budget execution 
mainly through reports (which are semi-annual and annual). One-third of local units 
have established a special monitoring procedure for major programs and projects. Only 
some local units’ assemblies feel the need for such a system and apply it at least to the 
Other
19%
Internet
17%
Written communication
19%
Special request
24%
Financial statements 
are not public
1%
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most important programs. Some local units have organized a monitoring committee 
appointed by the assembly with the task to inform the assembly twice (or more) a year 
about the eﬃciency and eﬃcacy of budget execution. 
The distribution of the assemblies’ monitoring and control mechanisms is shown 
in Figure 6.
Figure 6.
Monitoring and control mechanisms over budget execution
The basic internal structure for monitoring and control exists but procedures for 
good functioning are undeveloped. 
The procedures for discovering, preventing, and reporting irregularities are one of 
the basic tools of a budget watch program. The tenth question of the survey asks if such 
an irregularity procedure exists at the local unit level. The answers clearly show that:
 • there is no common understanding what the irregularities are (some of the local 
units think that irregularity is fraud; others understand irregularities as small 
and common mistakes),
 • irregularities are still a topic that a signiﬁcant number of local units try to avoid 
(18 percent did not answer the question);
 • there are no general rules established by the central government;
 • there are diﬀerent approaches in the practice on discovering and reporting the 
irregularities, shown in Figure 7. 
The following answers demonstrate how poor the understanding of irregularity 
procedure is:
 • everybody knows everything; there are no secrets as well as the irregularities; 
we are only eight;
Other
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 • there was no case of irregularity and because of that I cannot describe how the 
employees would react to it;
 • all irregularities are immediately corrected.
Figure 7.
Irregularity procedure
External monitoring mechanisms are poor. The eighth question checked if the local 
units feel that they are monitored, controlled, and audited, and what kind of monitor-
ing, control, and audit do they recognize and meet in their everyday activities. The 
State Audit Oﬃce was recognized as the main external monitoring body. Others were 
mostly examples of internally organized functions such as internal control, internal 
audit, monitoring performed by the assembly, and by the budget committee. Only a 
few local units mentioned an additional example of an external monitoring, control, 
and audit body beside the State Audit Oﬃce, namely the tax department. Nobody 
mentioned the central government, the Ministry of Finance, or other line-ministries. 
This result is a reﬂection of the reality of no established procedures for monitoring the 
local units by the central government. 
Kinds of monitoring, control, and audit mechanisms recognized by the local units 
are shown in Figure 8.  
Procedure is not defined
35%
Did not answer
18%
Other
5%
Report to the international 
audit/control
9%
Report to the responsible 
person (e.g., mayor)
23%
“Bottom to top” reporting
10%
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Figure 8.
Monitoring, control, and audit performed in LGUs
In the ninth question local units were to state who is (among citizens, NGOs, or 
media) organized to monitor the local unit’s activities and use of budget money, and 
how. Media are present the most, but citizens and NGOs are also recognized as entities 
that are trying to monitor what is happening in the local unit. The distribution of the 
answers is shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9.
Who monitors in an organized way the LGU’s activities 
and the use of the budget money?
State audit
42%
Internal control
25%
Other
13%
Internal audit
4%
Budget and finace committee
8%
Assembly
8%
Citizens
20%
Media
48%
NGOs
18%
Other
14%
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Citizens are, as an organized monitoring mechanism, more present in municipali-
ties than in towns and counties. Most of the municipalities described that citizens are 
organized and present in the local boards. Among NGOs, sport clubs, cultural institu-
tions, diﬀerent associations, and political parties were mentioned. They are interested 
in receiving ﬁnancial support from the local unit and monitor carefully what the local 
unit spends the money on.
Media—local radio, TV and newspapers—are the most powerful and inﬂuential. 
Lot of examples of special shows and columns are given. Media are able to initiate com-
munication between the public and local government, to talk openly about problems, 
and to change the mentality of secrecy. 
4. PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR SUBNATIONAL BUDGET WATCH 
 IN CROATIA 
The problem of a subnational budget watch in Croatia should be remedied by solving 
legal weaknesses and the lack of institutions and human resources. The solution of 
any of the above-mentioned issues will vary depending on the causes for the lack of a 
subnational budget watch by speciﬁc groups as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.
Causes for the lack of a subnational budget watch
Causes Central government Citizens, media, NGOs
1 2 3
Legal 
weaknesses
• no mechanism for monitoring and 
controlling the work of local units 
• no financial management and control 
mechanisms for achieving fiscal 
discipline, only limits on borrowing 
• absence of a system for internal 
information exchange and monitoring 
the efficient use of transfers
• no statutory provisions requiring 
public presentation (e.g., via web 
pages) of budget proposals at the 
preparation stage
• unavailability of information on 
budget execution
• lack of simplified financial reports 
intelligible to wider public
Lack of 
institutions
• State Audit Office and Budget 
Supervision are the only established 
institutions
• association of towns and 
municipalities—very passive and 
narrow functions
Capacity • lack of special knowledge 
(for monitoring and analysis) 
• the lack of staff  
• insufficient knowledge to deal with 
the information presented 
in a complicated way
Willingness • depends on political decision
• lack of capacity causes 
lack of willingness
• lack of awareness of the need for 
participation and of changes that can 
be encouraged
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These four factors of weak budget monitoring are interwoven and mutually enforce-
able. Some factors are currently more important (like dependency on political decision) 
while some other need more time and eﬀort (like the lack of special knowledge for moni-
toring and analysis and the lack of staﬀ). Additionally, decentralization is often one of the 
causes of weak oversight. Decentralization beneﬁts accrue from a closer linkage between 
ﬁscal decisions and communities, but the negative side is that administrative costs are 
likely to rise and decentralized activities are harder to monitor. All these weaknesses are 
blocking communication among all interested parties, and without communication it 
is not possible to have a good monitoring system in practice.
Table 2.
Who should do what and when?
Central government Subnational governments The public
Clearly define powers and 
responsibilities at each level of 
government.
Improve budget and 
accounts documentation.
Communicate, get 
involved, ask, and actively 
participate in all processes.
Establish stable transfer mechanisms 
based on objective criteria.
Report on risks to the 
legislature.
Give concrete suggestions.
Establish general government reporting 
procedures, accounting methodology, 
and politics (data standards).
Establish effective internal 
and external oversight 
mechanisms.
Expand knowledge and  
understand. 
Develop administrative capacity at all 
levels of government.
Act and change before 
“voting with feet.”
Assist subnational governments to 
improve transparency.
Rather than elaborating further on what could or should everyone do, we will only 
single out one of the proposals for the Ministry of Finance. We propose it to establish 
a monitoring committee, consisting of the representatives of all entities in the system, 
as shown in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10. 
 Proposal for the institutional framework for subnational budget watch
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (Ministry of Finance)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT
Department for budget 
preparation and finance
Other departments responsible 
for the uses of central 
government grants
Person responsible for the 
programs financed by central 
government grants 
(responsible person)
• Budget Law, By-law on monitoring
• Decision on minimum financial standards for decentralized financing
Participation
Ex-ante control
Ex-post control
MONITORING COMMITTEE
Chaired by (responsible person)
Containing representatives from:
• Department for Budget Preparation and Finance
• Ministry of Finance
• Department for Contracting
• Ministries responsible for the function in question
• Final beneficiary/budget users
• Representative of citizens and/or association of 
the towns and municipalities
DEPARTMENT FOR CONTRACTING
Ministry responsible for the function 
in question on the central government level 
(e.g., Ministry of Education for 
educational function…)
Citizens, NGOs, 
local units associations, 
media…
Final beneficieries/budget users
AgreementContractors
Participation
Contracting 
documentation
Contracting Payments
Participation
Participation Participation
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We are also proposing an action plan for the monitoring committee in Table 3.
Table 3.
 Monitoring committee’s action plan
What When Treatment Result
1 2 3 4
Proposition of 
the financial plans 
(programs)
In June Discussion and 
negotiation of 
acceptable programs
Stakeholders agreement 
on programs
Execution In July 
(for the first half of year)
In May 
(for the previous year)
Discussion of 
objectives achieved, 
review of performance 
measurement
• cutting  unsuccessful 
programs
• better allocation of 
money
Financial reports In July 
(for the first half of year)
In March 
(for the previous year)
Overview of the 
financial situation based 
on financial reports  
• better understanding 
of local unit’s 
financial capacity
• presentation to the 
public
• reports to be 
submitted to the 
representative body 
in the local unit 
• reports for public 
presentation
That is the step that Ministry of Finance could undertake to promote participation. 
All other parties interested in the budget, irrespective of their status should:
 • Insist on information 
  Request information from your own local unit about what has been done over 
the past year. Keep a watch on other local units, compare own unit with oth-
ers, and demand improvements where needed. Financial reports are not easy to 
understand and if a local unit has not adapted reports for its citizens, the public 
should insist on it and demand regular communication.
 • Ask and actively participate in the process
  Get organized and ask to be present at the meetings and the sessions held 
by the governing boards of local government units. Send requests for service 
improvements, establish written communication with your own local unit, 
initiate changes, and make suggestions for improvements. Positive examples 
are call-in radio shows where callers put forward their questions and requests 
for local government oﬃcials. Journalists then seek to provide citizens with the 
requested information and bring local oﬃcials to discuss issues on a live radio 
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broadcast. This type of communication usually resolves the problem to citizens’ 
satisfaction.
 • Cooperate with NGOs and participate in monitoring committees
  Below, in Table 4, is the roadmap for public monitoring.
Table 4.
 Roadmap for public monitoring
Process Involvement Time Result
1 2 3 4
Budget preparation • participation in 
decisions about 
programs 
June–October • better understanding of the 
work of local government
• more satisfaction with local 
government services
Budget execution • monitor, check 
the evidences on 
progress 
all year • prevention of the inefficient 
use of public funds
• prevention of fraud and 
irregularities
• developing budget execution 
reports for public
Financial reporting • comment, require 
simplicity, compare 
statement of 
revenues and 
expenses based 
on functional 
classification with 
other local units
July and 
February
• better understanding of 
the situation in the local 
community  
• idea about new possibilities for 
development
Monitoring • try to be formally 
present in all stages
all year • institutionalized monitoring 
committee
5. CONCLUSIONS
There are many reasons why the monitoring of subnational budgets is deﬁcient. We 
can single out the lack of an institutional and legal basis and the lack of knowledge and 
tradition making public ﬁnance public. The lack of knowledge is particularly pronounced 
in ﬁnancial management control and internal audit, the functions that soon are to be 
introduced at the central and local government level. Under the heading of tradition, 
we consider the passive way of functioning and the mentality of secrecy present for 
far too long. Mental and cultural changes are needed in order to introduce concept of 
accountability and responsibility. 
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Eﬀective monitoring requires that all stakeholders realize that the central government, 
local units, and citizens need to change their relationships and their attitudes towards 
public goods. Central government should the analyze information from local units, 
collect additional data on their activities, and regularly meet with their representatives. 
Local units should not be passive and just wait for the instructions from the central 
government. They can and have to be proactive in order to spark changes and develop-
ment of their environment. Citizens, for their part should organize better, break their 
passivity, and start to discuss, analyze, and make well-argued proposals. They have to 
use their power and demand accountability. Local administration is there because of 
citizens and for citizens.         
Reform measures for the establishment of the subnational budget watch system 
should include measures aimed at strengthening ﬁnancial control, improving exchange 
of information and communication, providing managers with the required ﬂexibility 
for eﬃcient management, and developing accountability for results. 
Given the author’s background, her ties to the Ministry of Finance, the conclusions 
of this chapter are limited insofar as they focus more on the institutional framework 
and central government role in a subnational budget watch program. 
In the future more in-depth research on local budgets’ transparency could examine 
what kind of changes in the budget methodology are needed to make local units more 
open and closer to their citizens. Another subject for further research is the role of civil 
society in a subnational budget watch agenda.      
6. ANNEX
6.1 Participation
Local units and the public are still passive. Some local units have tried to ﬁnd the 
mechanisms for communication with the public in order to involve it more in the 
budget processes. Still, there are no procedures based on which a local unit regularly 
and systematically communicates with the public; communication is more ad hoc and 
depends on the willingness from the both sides. There are certain number of local 
units that think that budget preparation and adoption is an internal process and that 
it is too technical an issue for public involvement. The citizens are still not aware of 
the possibility to organize themselves and participate in the decision-making process 
at the local unit level. The media are very active and try to monitor local units and in-
form citizens. They are currently the best connection between local units and citizens, 
but direct communication is missing. Local radio, TV, and newspapers are the most 
powerful and inﬂuential. Media should continue developing communication between 
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the public and local government, talking openly about the problems and changing the 
mentality of secrecy. 
6.2 Information
The information about local units’ activities is available to the public even though the 
majority of local units still do not put much eﬀort into making the information public. 
They mostly use easy and common means of communication such as Internet, TV, 
newspaper, and radio. Only 16 percent of local units prepare brochures and make the 
information more user friendly and understandable to the public. There is no organized 
and systematic approach with a clear goal and vision of what should be achieved through 
the process of improving the climate for a subnational budget watch program.   
6.3 Accountability
It is not easy to talk about accountability within the system in which controlling mecha-
nisms are not formally organized and established. Internally, accountability comes more 
as a consequence of a well-deﬁned control system in which the basic operational facts 
are determined. The main preconditions needed to achieve the culture of responsibility 
and accountability within the system are still missing. We mean the strong commitment 
from the top management; transparent, comprehensive, and easy-to-use written proce-
dures; a respected principle of separation of duties and powers assuring that there is no 
conﬂict of interest; an eﬀective internal control system: an independent audit function; 
eﬀective external control system: external audit, monitoring from diﬀerent bodies; ac-
tive stakeholders’ monitoring and involvement; proper procedures for communication 
with the stakeholders; developed information and reporting procedures. Until these 
preconditions are in place, accountability will remain ad hoc and rare.  
6.4 Basic Data about Local Finances
The data show very slow changes in ﬁnances of local units with respect to the general 
government. There is a slight increase in revenues and decrease in expenditures in the 
period 2002–2004. Local units’ expenses with respect to GDP also increased slightly. 
This data conﬁrms that the decentralization process did not move much further from 
the ﬁrst step and that Croatia is still a relatively highly centralized country.     
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Besides the size of ﬁscal capacity of local units, what is also important are their 
functions and tasks.  
 • Municipalities and towns have tasks and responsibilities in housing, spatial and 
urban planning, utilities, social and childcare, primary healthcare, elementary 
education, culture and sports, consumer protection, environmental protection, 
ﬁre protection, and civil service.
 • Counties are in charge of education, health, spatial and urban planning, econom-
ic development, transport and traﬃc infrastructure, planning and development 
of the network of education, and health, social, and cultural institutions.
Table A1. 
Local units’ revenues and expenses as a part of the general government 
revenues and expenses
[Billion HRK] 2002 2003 2004
Revenues Expenses Revenues Expenses Revenues Expenses
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
General government 75.3 75.4 81.0 80.8 88.8 87.7
Local units 11.8 9.40 13.8 10.9 14.8 11.7
Ratio (%) 15.6 12.4 17.0 13.4 16.7 13.3
Table A2. 
Local units’ expenses in relation to GDP
[Billion HRK] 2002 2003 2004
1 2 3 4
GDP 179.4 193.1 201.8
Local units 9.4 10.9 11.7
Ratio [%] 5.2 5.6 5.8
Decentralized functions (primary and secondary education, social welfare, healthcare, 
and ﬁre protection) of counties and cities are ﬁnanced from two main sources: additional 
share of income tax and equalization fund grants from the state budget. 
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Except for funding the decentralized functions, central government provides grants 
to counties, municipalities, and towns of the ﬁrst and second group in territories un-
der special state concern according to the criteria established in each ﬁscal year. These 
grants are intended for the adjustment of the budgetary ﬁscal capacity and investments 
in development programs of counties, municipalities, and towns. In addition to such 
direct allotments, relevant ministries transfer capital grants to local units for entrepre-
neurial programs, management of water, and others co-ﬁnance local units development 
programs. 
Table A4. 
Current grants from the state budget to local government units [HRK million]
Local units 
current 
subventions
2002 2003 2004
No. 
of units
Budgeted Actual No. 
of units
Budgeted Actual No. 
of units
Budgeted
Cities 29 60.5 24 48.7 46,9 11 9.8
Municipalities 82 65.8 72 54.6 53,9 55 26.3
Counties 20 74.6 20 80.6 80,6 14 39.8
Total 131 201.0 201.0 116 183.9 181.4 80 75.9
Source: Croatian State Budget for 2002, 2003, and 2004 and the Report on State Budget Execution for 
2003.
Table A5.
 Share of grants in central government revenues
[HRK billion] 2002 2003 2004
1 2 3 4
Central government revenues 69.6 74.7 82.3
Grants (and share in income tax) to the local units 1.5 1.7 2.0
Ratio [%] 2.2 2.3 2.4
6.5 Questionnaire about Local Government Units’ 
 Monitoring and Control System
This questionnaire is intended for the heads of the ﬁnancial divisions in the local units 
and its aim is to analyze:
 • the openness of the budget processes through testing information that is publicly 
available, communication methods with citizens
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 • mechanisms of monitoring and control that insures legal adoption and execu-
tion of the budget.
Data from the questionnaire will be used exclusively for analysis, therefore you are 
requested to answer the questions objectively and honestly. 
I. OPENNESS OF BUDGET PROCESSES
1. Does the public (citizens, nonproﬁt organizations, media, scientists and other 
stakeholders) have an insight in the budget draft (before the meeting of the rep-
resentative body at witch it is decided about the adoption of the ﬁnal budget):  
 ❏ YES 
  (if your answer is YES circle one of the options below which best describes the way 
in which public in your local unit have an insight in the budget draft)
  a) budget draft is shown on the website,
  b) budget draft is published in the local gazette, 
  c) budget draft is not published but everybody who is interested to have an 
insight and asks for it can get it,
  d) during the budget preparation process—from July to October, we are or-
ganizing discussions about the budget to which the representatives of the 
citizens, associations and other NGOs, media… are invited.  
 ❏ NO 
  (if your answer is NO circle one of the reasons below)
  a) publishing the budget draft is against the law,
  b) budget draft is a secret,
  c) public is not interested to be involved in the budget preparation process,
  d) publishing the budget draft would not make sense because in the negotia-
tion process only budget users and local unit participate,
  e) anything else
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2. Budget adopted by the assembly is published:
 ❏ YES 
  (if your answer is YES circle one or more of the options below)
  a) the legal obligation of the local unit is to publish the adopted budget,
  b) it is important to inform the public about programs and aims which are to 
be achieved during budget execution in the following year,
  c) local unit needs to get feedback from the public whether the budget satisﬁes 
or not their expectations,
  d) anything else
 ❏ NO 
(if your answer is NO circle one or more of the options below)
  a) budget is too complicated and public can not understand it,
  b) public is not interested in the budget,
  c) there is no possibilities to inﬂuence the budget (to change it) after its adop-
tion and because of that communication with the public after that has no 
sense,
  d) anything else 
3. The discussion about the annual and semiannual report on budget execution is:
 ❏ PUBLIC discussion 
(if you answer is PUBLIC circle one or more of the options below)
  a) special simpliﬁed brochures are prepared and distributed to citizens in order 
to enable them to be informed about the local unit’s activities and achieve-
ments,
  b) representatives of citizens, media, NGOs and other organizations are invited 
to meetings of the assembly on which the reports on budget execution are 
discussed,
  c) representatives of citizens, media, NGOs and other organizations prepare 
their reports on how their expectations have been fulﬁlled and these reports 
are also a part of the assembly discussion about budget execution,
  d) anything else 
 ❏ NON-PUBLIC discussion 
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4. The public attitude towards the local unit’s programs and their satisfaction with 
the services is regularly examined:
 ❏ YES (explain how)
 ❏ NO (explain why) 
5. Citizens have an insight in the local unit’s ﬁnancial statements (circle one or more 
of the options below):
 a) through the Internet,
 b)  through brochures and other written means of communication,
 c)  they have to submit a special request,
 d)  ﬁnancial statement are not for the public,
 e) anything else
6. Management’s attitude about citizens’ participation in the budget processes is best 
described as (circle the statement which suit best):
 a) there is no need to involve the public in the budget processes because they do 
not have enough knowledge for active and quality participation,
 b) public involvement is inevitable because the aim of local unit’s operations is to 
satisfy the citizens needs. If the citizens are not actively involved in the budget 
processes it is not possible for the local unit to know if the aim is being fulﬁlled 
and what to undertake in the case when the aim is unfulﬁlled.
II. MECHANISMS OF MONITORING AND CONTROL WHICH 
 INSURES LEGAL ADOPTION AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET 
7. After the budget adoption the assembly undertakes the monitoring and control 
mechanisms over the budget execution in the following way (circle one or more 
options below):
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 a) based on the annual and semiannual reports on budget execution,
 b) some important and major programs and projects are specially monitored and 
reports about their execution are prepared and given to the assembly more 
frequently,
 c) the assembly has appointed the monitoring committee the task to inform twice 
(or more) a year the assembly about the eﬃciency and eﬃcacy of the budget 
execution,
 d) anything else
8. State all kinds of monitoring, controls, and audits which are normally preformed 
in your local unit:
9. Who outside the budget system (local unit and budget users) monitor in an organ-
ized way the activities of the local unit and the use of the budget money (circle 
one or more of the answers below):
 a) citizens (if you have circled this answer please describe how they are organized)
 b) NGOs (if you have circled this answer please state which ones and how they 
are organized)
 c) local radio, TV, and newspapers (if they have some special shows or editorial 
columns meant for the discussion of the local unit’s activities and citizens’ sat-
isfaction or something similar related to the local community, state their title 
and shortly describe their aim)
 d) anybody else
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10. If somebody among the employees notices an irregularity in the local unit’s activi-
ties is there any rule for him/her how to proceed and to whom to report. If your 
answer is YES describe shortly the procedure.
GENERAL INFORMATION
11. The job and the position of the person who has fulﬁlled this questionnaire
12. Local unit for which the questionnaire is fulﬁlled is:
 a) county
 b) town
 c) municipality
13. Number of citizens and size of the budget in the local unit:
number of citizens
size of the budget 2004
Please mail the ﬁlled questionnaire by April 20 to the following address: 
 Ministarstvo ﬁnancija
 att. Mrs. Ivana Maletić
 Katančićeva 5, 10000 Zagreb
Or by fax: 01/4591-473.
If you need to ask anything do not hesitate to call 01/4591-093.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!
Date:
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ENDNOTES
1 www.mﬁn.hr → local government → counties 
2 At the beginning of the research the intention was to survey citizens too, but after a pilot project 
with a group of colleagues who are all experts in the ﬁeld, yet completely uninformed as citizens, 
I realized that it made no sense. All the answers were negative because the experts from the pilot 
were not acquainted with the budgets of their local units. Here is a sample of the questions: Have 
you ever had an opportunity to see or read the budget of the local unit in which you live? Have 
you ever had an opportunity to participate in the process of budget adoption? Do you monitor 
how and with which results programs and projects preformed in your local unit are executed?
REFERENCES
International Budget Project. 2004. Opening Budgets to Public Understanding and De-
bate—Results from 36 countries. October.
IMF. 2001. Manual on Fiscal Transparency. Washington, D.C.: IMF.
IMF. 2001b. Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001. Washington, D.C.: IMF.
IMF. 2004. Republic of Croatia: Report on Observance of Standards and Codes—
Fiscal Transparency Module. IMF Country Report No. 04/365. Washington, D.C.: 
IMF. 
Jakir-Bajo, I. and I. Maletić 2003. “Budget Planning and Accounting.” Zagreb. 
Maletić, I. 2001. “Economic and Functional Classiﬁcation as a Base for Budget Plan-
ning and Execution.” No. 11. 
Ott, K. and A. Bajo. 2001. “Local Government Budgeting in Croatia.” Zagreb: Institute 
of Public Finance.
Ott, K. 2004. Promoting Participation in the Budgetary Process—The Case Study of the 
Work of the Institute of Public Finance in Croatia. Washington, D.C.: Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities.
Pisauro, G. 2001. Intergovernmental Relations and Fiscal Discipline: Between Commons and 
Soft Budget Constraints. IMF Working Paper No. 01/65. Washington, D.C.: IMF.
Premchand, A. (ed.). 1990. Government Financial Management—Issues and Country 
Studies. Washington, D.C.: IMF. 
Premchand, A. 1993. Public Expenditure Management. Washington, D.C.: IMF. 
OECD. 2001. Managing Public Expenditure—A Reference Book for Transition Countries. 
Paris: OECD.
50
M A K I N G  P U B L I C  F I N A N C E  P U B L I C
World Bank. 2004. Croatia: Country Financial Accountability Assessment. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank. November.
Laws
Budget Act. Oﬃcial Gazette. No. 96/03.
EC Council Regulation no. 1605/2002 of June 25, 2002, on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the General Budget of the European Communities.
Law on Financing Local Government Units. Oﬃcial Gazette. Nos. 117/93, 33/00, 
59/01, 107/01, 117/01, 150/02, and 147/03.
Rulebook on Government Accounting and General Ledger. Oﬃcial Gazette. No. 
27/05.
Rulebook on Financial Reporting in Government Sector. Oﬃcial Gazette. No. 27/05.
State Audit Law. Oﬃcial Gazette. No. 49/03.
51
Subnational Budget Monitoring 
in Macedonia: Case Studies of 
Municipalities of Štip and Gostivar
Zhidas Daskalovski
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper tackles the question of subnational budgetary monitoring in Macedonia. It 
oﬀers a general analysis of the decentralization reforms in the country with a particular 
attention to the possibilities for the public oversight of budgets on the local govern-
ment level. The paper argues that the legal order does not prescribe the process and that 
there are also no clear possibilities within the law for budgetary oversight by concerned 
citizens and nongovernmental organizations. Moreover, as the examples from the two 
municipalities of Štip and Gostivar show, budgetary monitoring on the subnational 
level is very diﬃcult to undertake in practice. To change the present circumstances the 
author recommends a number of policy measures aimed at strengthening the role of 
the civil sector in the budgetary oversight of local governments.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the process of decentralization, the Government of Macedonia has committed itself 
to devolve the responsibilities of the central government to local government units. This 
may result in better governance and create more opportunities for citizens to participate 
in the civil society and may further democratize and stabilize the country. 
Decentralization reform is supposed to provide better public inputs that ultimately 
aim to enhance the growth of the local communities in comparison to a centralized 
system that often results in concentrating power and growth in the capital city Skopje. 
This paper argues that, in order to ensure an eﬀective use of public funds, the decen-
tralization process in Macedonia should be accompanied with an adequate and close 
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monitoring of all the stages of the budget process at the local level to guarantee its ef-
fective execution. Citizen-driven budget monitoring is part of new eﬀorts to introduce 
transparency in the democratization of the country.
The ﬁrst part of the chapter provides a short overview of Macedonian decentraliza-
tion where competences were transferred to local self-governments to collect taxes and 
reallocate funds for ﬁnancing public services on the local level. This assumes that the 
mechanisms for monitoring the performance of the budget are not very satisfactory, 
largely because models of participation and monitoring for local government budget-
ing do not exist. Indeed, the second part of the chapter—an analysis of the related 
legislation and the description of the realities concerning budget monitoring in two 
Macedonian municipalities—Štip in the east of the country and Gostivar in the 
west—conﬁrms the problem of budget monitoring on the subnational level. In fact, 
this chapter will reveal that achieving an eﬀective public supervision over the municipal 
budgets of Gostivar and Štip is diﬃcult, and that the local authorities hardly are pre-
pared to step beyond regime-like behavior and accept the principles of accountability 
and transparency. 
In the next section the chapter oﬀers a brief description of the importance of budget 
monitoring and an evaluation of policy options for Macedonia. The chapter concludes 
that the Macedonian citizens, who are supposed to be the main beneﬁciaries of decen-
tralization reform at the moment, do not participate in the monitoring of the budget 
cycle at the subnational level of government. With that in mind, decentralization reform 
should be aimed at empowering civil society and giving it the skills, knowledge, and 
awareness of its role in putting leaders and public oﬃcials at task to deliver and ensure 
eﬀective service delivery to their constituencies as direct beneﬁciaries.
2. SUBNATIONAL BUDGET MONITORING IN MACEDONIA
 EXPLAINED AND EVALUATED
2.1 Decentralization Reform and Subnational Budget Monitoring
Before the reforms of 2004, according to one analysis, Macedonia was one of the least 
decentralized nations in the world when measured by the relative size of the budgets of 
its local governments (Rafuse 2002: 2). 
Following the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, Macedonia has engaged in a 
thorough decentralization eﬀort, committing itself to devolve responsibilities from 
the central government to local government (LED) units.1 The government aimed at 
correcting inadequacies in the functioning of municipalities and enhancing their 
capacity  to create sustainable local economic development by using their own revenues. 
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Thus, decentralization implies the transfer of responsibilities to local self-government, 
in terms of tax collection and reallocation of funds for ﬁnancing public services on the 
local level. 
After  the reforms of 2004, municipalities are to be ﬁnanced from their own revenue 
sources, government grants, and other sources, including borrowing. The property, 
inheritance, gift, and sales taxes on real estate and property rights, as well as commu-
nal fees, will become the truly individual sources of revenues for local governments. 
Moreover, the municipalities will now be responsible for setting the rates on these taxes, 
communal fees, and charges like the hotel duty/tax and the sign fee, with maximum 
and minimum limits speciﬁed by the Law on Property Taxes (Levitas 2004: 10). Other 
revenues will include a three percent share of the personal income tax paid by people 
living in a given municipality2 (Law on Craftsmanship). In addition to own revenues, 
the Law on Financing Local Self-Government Units envisages a number of grants given 
by the central budget as additional revenues for the municipalities: revenues from value 
added tax (general grants), block grants, earmarked grants, capital grants, and grants 
for delegated competencies.
The municipalities manage their budgets according to the guidelines provided by 
the Ministry of Finance. The mayor has full authority to make all payments as well as to 
authorize all procurement and is accountable to the city council. He has a legal obliga-
tion to provide a report to the council on all expenditures made during the course of 
the year. Municipalities do exercise their right to move expenditures among various line 
items during the year. Expenditures are recorded when they are paid from the account, 
and any funds remaining in the municipality account at the end of the year are carried 
forward into the next ﬁscal year as a surplus.  
The Budget Law regulates the procedure of preparation, adoption, and execution of 
the municipal budget. The process begins with directions proposed by the Ministry of 
Finance for the estimated budget revenues and expenditures for the following budget-
ary year and their submissions to the government. Then, the minister circulates a letter 
containing the main guidelines for the preparations of municipal budgets and forwards 
it to the local units. The units of the local self-government, within the determined 
maximum amounts of expenditure, prepare a draft budget request. The draft contains 
the funds allocated to the municipal council, the mayor, and the administrative bod-
ies, and to various programs (like communal regulation, street lighting, roads, parks, 
or forestry) and submits it to the Ministry of Finance. Thus, upon receiving the draft 
budget request from the municipality, the Ministry of Finance evaluates it considering 
its “eﬃciency, priority and rationality, and reconciles it with the budget beneﬁciar-
ies.” On the basis of the reconciliations with the budget beneﬁciaries, the Ministry of 
Finance prepares a draft budget and submits it to the government, which than adopts 
it, and by mid-November submits it to the Assembly for further adoption. The Parlia-
ment debates on the draft budget “not prior to 20 days from the day of its submission,” 
54
M A K I N G  P U B L I C  F I N A N C E  P U B L I C
but in practice, the budget is often adopted later than the beginning of the ﬁscal year, 
although not later than March of every year (The Macedonian Government’s Answers 
to the EU Questionnaire on the Application for Membership: 49). 
In accordance with the relevant law, the State Audit Oﬃce (SAO) performs both 
state audits and audits of the budgets of local self-government units. Additionally, there 
is a system of regular (ex post) internal accounting control, which monitors whether 
the ﬁnancial transactions are executed in accordance with legal regulations, whether 
there is appropriate accounting documentation, and whether the ﬁnancial statements 
provide complete, authentic, and reliable information on the year’s ﬁnancial changes 
and transactions. 
According to the oﬃcial government conclusions adopted on January 26, 2004, 
internal audit units within the local government units are to be established by the end 
of March 2006 (Answers to the EU Questionnaire: 15). These units are supposed to be 
provided with separate resources to achieve organizational and functional independ-
ence. Within units of local self-government, a certiﬁed accountant will carry out ex 
ante control of the accounting documents. This control encompasses all accounting 
documents and an authentic and realistic presentation of the accounting changes, i.e., 
transactions. Until the internal audit entities in local government units are established, 
the Section for Central Internal Audit within the Ministry of Finance will perform the 
internal audit in the units of local self-government. 
2.2 Evaluation of the Current Legal Situation 
Macedonian local government is in a state of ﬂux. Thorough reforms have been 
envisioned, adopted, and planned in diﬀerent spheres of governance on the local 
level. 
Accordingly, the 2004 Law on Local Government gives new and increased compe-
tences to local government units in the spheres of primary health care, primary education, 
sport, and culture, as well as the promotion of citizens’ participation. The law attempts 
to guarantee better services to citizens since most of the prerogatives are given to the 
local municipalities, and this decentralization process touches upon the issues in this 
chapter. In the process, the highly centralized political system will be changed so that 
budget formation and monitoring will be enhanced signiﬁcantly at the local level. The 
result of the legal reform—the creation of own resources through the collection of local 
taxes and the allocation of three percent from the value added tax for local use—will 
help the local authorities develop the municipal budgets in accordance to the needs of 
the citizens in the locality. 
The greater the degree of decentralization (ﬁscal, functional, and ﬁnancial) is, the 
greater is the need for improved systems of accountability. This is a standard European 
55
S U B N A T I O N A L  B U D G E T  M O N I T O R I N G  I N  M A C E D O N I A
practice relevant to Macedonia. The EU accession process, for example, highlights the 
need to develop systems of external audit for local governments and to restrict indebted-
ness, measures that are both unpopular and technically demanding.
Within the legal framework there is no mention of the possibilities for citizens’ 
involvement in the budgetary process. Budget monitoring is determined to be the 
obligation of the Ministry of Finance and the State Audit Oﬃce, with the future 
internal audit units within the local government units taking over some of the re-
sponsibilities. Indeed, these units for internal audit will give local governments greater 
autonomy in the process of monitoring the budget execution. The decentralization and 
the transfer of competences to the local authorities do not directly provide legal tools for 
the involvement of citizens in the budgetary process. However, the legislature does not 
preclude the local government’s budget monitoring by concerned citizens either. Quite 
the contrary, a number of legal provisions from the Law on Local Self-government can 
be seen as encouraging such actions.
According to the Constitution and the Law on Local Self-government, local units 
have the right to local self-governance through direct participation of citizens in decisions 
about common matters. Moreover, the reformulated text of Article 115, Paragraph 1 of 
this law refers to the jurisdiction of units of the local self-government. This jurisdiction 
has been modiﬁed to read:  
  In units of local self-government, citizens directly and through representatives 
participate in decision-making on issues of local relevance, particularly in the 
ﬁeld of public services, urban and  rural planning, environmental protection, 
local economic development, local ﬁnances, communal activities, culture, sport, 
social security and child care, education, primary health care and other ﬁelds 
determined by law (emphasis added).
These legal provisions, although they do not directly provide for the possibility for 
budget supervision on the local level, ensure the legal background for such activity. 
However, is budget monitoring on the citizens’ groups agenda? How cooperative are 
municipalities in allowing supervision of budgets on a subnational level? 
2.3 Practical Considerations: Municipal Debt
For ﬁscal decentralization to be a success, the indebtedness of local government units is 
a serious issue. The laws stipulate that the budgets of the local self-government units are 
not allowed to have a deﬁcit. In practice, however, local governments have debts, and 
to manage the debts they sometimes have to undertake illegal ﬁnancial management 
practices. One such practice is that subnational governments simply do not process 
incoming invoices into the accounting system, assuming, that if debt is not reported, 
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then it does not exist (Schlumberger 2004: 34). This very simple “strategy” of local gov-
ernments cannot be easily identiﬁed by the State Audit Oﬃce or by the local council. 
Since within the law there is no provision for recording a commitment when expendi-
ture is authorized, in subnational governments there is often no record of invoices that 
have been received by the municipality, but have not been paid (Op. cit.: 20). Another 
“strategy” to deal with debt is to open a second bank account. In principle, local govern-
ments are not allowed to open more than one bank account, and all the transactions 
of sub-accounts should be managed through this main bank account. However, for 
managing ﬁnancial transactions, when the local government’s bank account is blocked, 
municipalities have opened alternative accounts. This system has been tolerated by the 
government, “as this was the only way to keep the local governments in business and 
provide the basic, minimum level of public services” (Op. cit.: 35). Starting from 2004, 
local governments are not allowed to have more than one bank account. However, the 
enforcement of this new regulation is doubtful. As the former compulsory agency for 
payment and transfer system (Zavod za Platen Promet) ceased to exist, there is no eﬀec-
tive mechanism controlling local ﬁnancial management in this respect.
According to a recent study, local governments owe suppliers of goods and services 
more than MKD 2.6 billion without interest, and about MKD 3.2 billion with interest, 
respectively one-third or one-half of the entire sector’s revenues in 2004 (Op. cit.: 35).3 
About 75 percent of this debt is owed to construction companies. Creditors have court 
orders to block money on municipal accounts to serve debts, and in 2004 around 40 
municipalities have had their accounts blocked for short periods. In order to resolve the 
debt, a Debt Resolution Plan is currently being prepared, as a precondition for the ﬁscal 
decentralization (Answers to the EU Questionnaire: 42). Considering the circumstances, 
it is clear that making public ﬁnances public under a subnational watch scheme will be 
a sensitive issue in many Macedonian municipalities. 
3. WHY IS SUBNATIONAL BUDGET MONITORING IN MACEDONIA
 IMPORTANT? PRACTICES FROM ŠTIP AND GOSTIVAR
This section oﬀers an assessment of what is the situation on the ground. We ask to what 
extent are such common instruments of involvement—like citizen committees, polling, 
public opinion surveys, public hearings, information dissemination, informal meetings 
with community representatives and NGOs, or open houses—represented in the cur-
rent budgetary practice of the local government units? Our ﬁeld work seeks to answer 
if the data available, reliable, and of quality? Furthermore, is the data timely and is it 
possible to compare actual versus planned ﬁgures? We conducted the ﬁeld work in the 
municipalities of Štip and Gostivar. The need for comparison of these two municipali-
ties was based on the following criteria: 
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 • Similar size (both municipalities have approximately 45,000 inhabitants)
 • Ethnicity/multiethnicity (Gostivar is a truly multiethnic municipality, with 
Macedonians, Albanians, and Turks living there, while Štip is predominantly 
Macedonian municipality with a small number of Vlachs) 
 • Geographic location (Gostivar is located in western Macedonia, while Štip is 
in eastern Macedonia).
By assessing Štip and Gostivar we shall draw a picture of the current local gov-
ernment policy (actual practice) concerning public involvement in the budgetary 
process. Thus, what are the possibilities for budget monitoring in these munici-
palities? To ascertain this, ﬁeld work was conducted over a period of nine months. 
The main stakeholders were interviewed and the possibilities for citizens input in the 
budgetary process and monitoring were evaluated. Besides public institutions and the 
mayors’ oﬃces, local civil society organizations also were consulted. 
Our ﬁeld work reveals a complex situation in both Štip and Gostivar. On the 
one hand, the local authorities proclaim that there are possibilities for such measures, 
i.e., “There is no problem with that. The citizens are informed and can monitor.” 
On the other hand, once we checked this issue, we realized that actually there are no 
actions undertaken by the local authorities in this regard. Quite the contrary. More-
over, citizens and citizen associations of these municipalities seem to have little 
interest in the issue, remain passive regarding public involvement, and have not 
considered placing budget supervision on their agenda.
Let us ﬁrst start with the description of the situation in the municipality of Štip.4 
Responding to the question whether the municipality can generate suﬃcient revenues, 
so that, within the framework of a ﬁscally decentralized system, it is able to function 
properly, the mayor of Štip answered positively, replying that the municipality is an 
entity with a strong economy to tax and that the municipality has a “suﬃcient technical 
and human capacity to cope with the challenges of ﬁscal decentralization” (Inter-
view, January 14, 2005). Concerning the question of budget monitoring, the mayor 
pointed out that the citizens can be involved in the whole process and that the budget 
is freely available to the public. When asked for a copy of the budget, however, 
the member of the mayor’s staﬀ, who was instructed to provide us with one, delivered 
only very general data about this year’s budget. Only when we mentioned that we 
would like to be given the full budget of the municipality, upon the insistence of 
the mayor, did the concerned person provide us with the requested data. In the ﬁrst 
instance we were given the introductory page of the budget that only speciﬁes the 
total budget revenues and expenditures. Later, we were given the additional pages that 
contain information on all the revenues and expenditures broken down into categories 
(Interview, November 10, 2004). The full budget contains data about the revenues 
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from diﬀerent kind of taxes, expenditures on the salaries of the personnel, honoraria, 
per diems, travel expenses, etc., some of which might be sensitive if distributed without 
approval from the mayor.
This small episode indicated that budget monitoring in the municipality is not such 
a simple aﬀair as stated by the mayor. We immediately asked him if the full budget is 
available to the citizens of Štip, and if yes, how can they get a copy of it, i.e., if there 
was a special procedure that might discourage them from doing so. The answer was 
that the whole budget is available to the citizens at the Citizens’ Information Center, 
located in the same building (Interview, November 10, 2004). To appraise if this is so, 
during the next ﬁeld trip to Štip, I visited the aforesaid center. The personnel in the 
Citizens’ Information Center were nice and cooperative up to the moment when they 
were asked for the budget of the municipality. This kind of cooperation was out of ques-
tion, and the budget could not have been given without the permission of the mayor 
(Meeting at the Citizens’ Information Center, December 7, 2004). When I explained 
how the mayor approved of citizens getting copies of the budget, the responsible person 
retracted his position but mentioned that “in any case they did not have the budget” and 
that I should consult the mayor’s oﬃce (Meeting at the Citizens’ Information Center, 
December 7, 2004).
This anecdotal evidence on the possibility of budget monitoring in the muni-
cipality of Štip gave a rather bleak picture of the situation regarding citizens’ involve-
ment in the areas of local government that are of direct public interest. Interviews 
with stakeholders from the NGO sector in Štip and a brief analysis of the scope 
of their activities and mission statements conﬁrmed that the NGO sector is en-
gaged minimally in the supervision of the work of the local government (Interviews 
with Chefutov, Donski, and Longurova).5 Neither is budget monitoring on the 
agenda of any NGO in Štip. On the other hand, although transparent at the ﬁrst 
instance, the local government is hardly helpful as far as the possibilities for moni-
toring of the execution of the local budget are concerned. This is of a special worry 
when taking into consideration the upcoming reforms and the transfer of compe-
tencies and ﬁnancial autonomy to the local governments throughout the country. 
Larger prerogatives of the municipality authorities will require an even greater need 
for supervision of the work of the local government and monitoring of the budget.
What looked like a manageable problem concerning the possibilities for budget 
monitoring in the municipality of Štip was nothing compared to the experience in the 
Gostivar municipality. In Gostivar, like in Štip, very few stakeholders from the civil sec-
tor take interest in the quality of work of the local authorities (Interviews with Ademi, 
Fetahi, and Mitro). However, if this appeared similar to Štip, the approach of the local 
authorities to the issue of budget monitoring was rather diﬀerent in Gostivar. Namely, 
at the interview with the mayor of Gostivar we encountered a closeness regarding data 
from the budget, even hostility. The mayor, Mr. Xhemail Rexhepi, refused to give us 
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the budget claiming that we have no right to such information (Interview, September 
23, 2004).
With such an attitude from the highest oﬃcial of the municipality, it is diﬃcult 
to imagine that local civil society in Gostivar would have any chance to monitor the 
budget. It is also problematic to understand how data from the budget can be withheld 
from the public by a mayor who has fully embraced international projects aimed at 
improving relations with the citizens of Gostivar. The opening of the UNDP-funded 
Gostivar Citizens’ Information Center (or Municipality Information Technology Center), 
the help of the USAID/Local Government Reform Project in publishing the Annual 
Report of Activities for the Municipality of Gostivar, and a number of other similar 
projects were implemented in this local government unit. Even more surprising is the 
fact that within the Annual Report the municipality has published a detailed budget 
sheet for the year 2002, with a detailed commentary on the revenues gathered and the 
realized expenditures.6 
In the Annual Report, there is a note in the comments on the realized expenditures 
that the municipality has inherited a large debt that has been growing continuously as 
a result of high interest rates. Surely the reason why the mayor was so sensitive about 
the idea of budget monitoring was related to this issue. According to the Macedonian 
media daily Utrinski Vesnik, Gostivar was one of the few municipalities in the country 
that ran a huge public debt. This newspaper reported that, according to a study done by 
the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank, the municipality of Gostivar has a debt 
of MKD 135 million (about EUR 2.2 million) and is third in the list of indebted local 
government units in Macedonia after the municipalities of Ohrid and Struga (Utrinski 
Vesnik 2005). The biggest single debt of the Gostivar municipality is to the construc-
tion company Granit. Moreover, according to one newspaper report, the mayor of the 
Gostivar municipality has “opened a personal account which was used for the oﬃcial 
business of the local government unit” (Utrinski Vesnik 2005). Bearing in mind such 
reports, it would not be surprising that the mayor of this municipality was not ready to 
discuss budget monitoring with any interested party. The indebtedness of the Macedo-
nian municipalities such as Gostivar and the existence of illegal subnational governments’ 
accounts only underscore the importance of citizens’ budget monitoring.
The new mayor of Gostivar, Mr. Nevzat Bejta, is a more transparent and law-abiding 
head of the municipality. In an interview with the author he explained that the problems 
of the municipality stem from the illegal practices of the previous administration and 
that he has successfully negotiated the debt to Granit (Interview with Nevzat Bejta, 
October 5, 2005). The account of the municipality has been reopened and we could 
immediately receive a copy of the municipality budget. While the mayor was coopera-
tive and transparent, only a few days earlier the staﬀ in the municipality responsible for 
budgeting was not. I was confronted with open disapproval when asking for a copy of 
the budget, comments being made such as, “When you go to the Ministry of Defense 
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you do not ask for secret ﬁles,” and, “You make a written request, we will discuss it, and 
maybe we will approve giving you a copy.” Considering the evidence, publicly approved 
and legally allowed, the possibility for a subnational budget watch program is a priority 
for a democratic and transparent Macedonia. 
4. EVALUATING POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPROVING 
 SUBNATIONAL BUDGET MONITORING 
A partnership between the citizens and the government depends upon citizens hav-
ing access to the information that impacts their lives. In our case, citizens should be 
included in the local budgeting process and in its supervision. They should be aware of 
what the budget is and have the opportunity to inﬂuence its preparation and monitor 
its execution. Generally speaking, budgets are instruments for mobilization, alloca-
tion, and utilization of resources. The budget represents the fundamental vehicle for 
articulating and delivering government policy. Typically, where budgets are not reliably 
implemented, policy inconsistencies will follow. One may distinguish between monitor-
ing and budget monitoring to understand its potentially sensitive nature. Monitoring 
is a continuous process of collecting and analyzing data to compare how well a project, 
program, or policy is being implemented against expected results. On the other hand, 
budget monitoring is the activity of investigating the rhetoric of public oﬃcials, match-
ing it with the budget lines, understanding what the funds are spent on, and examining 
the role of audit chambers. 
Budget monitoring is necessary to ensure that the communities understand their 
rights, obligations, and entitlements. This is intended to build the conﬁdence of the 
community; to encourage them to participate actively in performance monitoring us-
ing skills, information, and knowledge about budgetary processes; and to contribute 
to better governance at the local level. Moreover, it helps the public entities achieve 
their goals by applying a planned, strictly deﬁned approach to assess and improve the 
performance in the processes of risk management, control, and management. Good 
governance dictates that government operations and decisions should be made openly, 
and with the active participation of those people inﬂuenced by them. Transparent 
systems that provide for budget monitoring have several advantages. Since the budget 
is the primary economic policy document of the government, its monitoring by the 
public is particularly important. 
Indeed, it can be argued that the public has the basic right to information about 
the budget and to have its views considered in budget decisions. Some of the beneﬁts 
of budget monitoring include: identiﬁcation of the weaknesses and strengths of govern-
mental policies, thereby promoting needed reforms; accountable government—elected 
oﬃce holders and public servants may be more likely to act in a responsible manner 
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if their decisions are open to public scrutiny; a safeguard against corruption by public 
oﬃcials; increased trust in governments and social cohesion—if the public can better 
understand what their governments are doing and why, they may have more conﬁdence 
in government and be prepared to accept and trust diﬃcult compromises; and so on 
(cf. Ott and Bajo 2001; International Budget Project of the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities).
Moreover, by having a clear understanding of the government’s policies and actions, 
international and local investors are likely to be more willing to invest resources. The 
powers of local self-government bodies originate from local people and communities. 
Local self-government bodies use their powers on behalf of and for the beneﬁt of the 
community residents who have the right to assess the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of 
self-governments, and their ability and willingness to protect the interests of the com-
munity. Participation in the budgeting process is an opportunity for citizens to learn 
more about their municipality, and its ﬁnancial and other limitations. Experiences 
show that when citizens are aware of municipal limitations regarding its competen-
cies and ﬁnances, they more readily accept that the municipality cannot solve all 
their problems (Hadzhi-Vasileva 2004: 11). While budget monitoring helps build 
up a consensus on policy and allocation decisions, this consensus will be deepened if 
civil society is allowed signiﬁcant inputs into the debate. Transparency and parti-
cipation are mutually reinforcing and both are needed for better budgetary outcomes. 
In fact, the involvement of civil society actors can improve policy and budget alloca-
tion decisions by bringing diﬀerent perspectives and creativity to the budget debates. 
Considering the above, the following review of the policy problems and evaluation 
of policy options can be made. Macedonian budgetary process remains largely unaﬀected 
by input from civil society. The budget preparation is not discussed outside government 
or submitted to prior external review by NGOs or academics. But budget execution 
is not being monitored by the civil sector either. Although lawmakers have envisioned 
a number of mechanisms for internal and external control over the ﬁnancial work of 
local government units, there is no explicit legal provision that involves experts or 
the NGO sector in the budget monitoring on a subnational level. The problem with 
the ﬁnance system as a whole is that it provides no mechanism for the citizens of indi-
vidual municipalities to express their willingness to actively participate in the budgetary 
process. On the other hand, the relevant laws do not preclude such an activity either. 
The lack of citizens’ budget monitoring on a subnational level can lead to ﬁnancial 
irregularities that burden the normal work of local government units. For various 
reasons, including bad management, carelessness in the ﬁnancial work of the munici-
palities, political inﬂuence, and so on, many of the existing Macedonian municipalities 
have huge public debts. Although tolerated by the central government, accumulating 
such debt is not legal. 
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On the one hand, the central authorities have become aware of the fact that some-
thing needs to be done about the proper execution of the budgets by local government 
units. The Ministry of Finance has issued a tender for providing consulting services for 
training personnel in the local government units responsible for managing, budgeting, 
and administrating municipal ﬁnances (Dnevnik 2005). By law, it is also stipulated that 
internal audit units will be established in the oﬃces of the local authorities throughout 
Macedonia. Therefore, the budget management of the municipalities is an important 
issue for the government.
However, for successful and transparent management of the local budgets, besides 
the state, the citizens need to become directly involved in the process of supervision 
of the budgetary process. It is not enough that the Law on Local Self-government 
deﬁnes “direct citizen participation” as the individual or collective involvement of the 
inhabitants of a municipality at diﬀerent levels of the decision-making process of lo-
cal government. It does not suﬃce that Article 30 of the new law states that the local 
government should solicit public input on municipal issues and also should involve the 
public in policymaking and the budgeting process. There is still a culture of passivity 
in Macedonia, as far as citizen involvement at the local level is concerned. A survey by 
Transparency International revealed that over 40 percent of the Macedonians did not 
know that they have a constitutional right to access to public information (A1 television 
interview with Zoran Jachev, October 17, 2004). Citizens are “reticent to react against 
the lack, insuﬃcient, or low quality of public services, the abuse of constitutional rights 
and a low participation in developing and deﬁning public policies” (Hadzhi-Vasileva 
2004: 7).
Such attitudes and such passivity on the part of the citizens is highly related to the 
culture of public oﬃcials in the country. In a few cases, municipalities, in cooperation 
with the international community, have encouraged citizens to get involved in policy-
making and legislation development, but many Macedonians perceive government 
oﬃcials as powerful, “untouchable” cliques. On the other hand, the prevailing political 
culture in the country is such that the decisions of the government and the policymaking 
process are typically done behind closed doors, without the input and consultation of a 
wider network of stakeholders such as citizens, civil society groups, or academic experts. 
A somewhat typical example was the government’s decision-making process over the 
new territorial organization of the municipalities in Macedonia, a highly secretive and 
reticent aﬀair (Daskalovski 2004b). Moreover, information is not readily given to citizens, 
even if they explicitly ask for it. A survey by the Macedonian chapter of Transparency 
International showed that 70 percent of those citizens that asked for information from 
state institutions have had diﬃculties obtaining it, and that 27 percent of them did not 
receive any answers from the state organs, while 33 percent were refused access to the 
needed information with no explanation (A1 television interview with Zoran Jachev, 
October 17, 2004). 
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Moreover, as the debate over the new Law on Territorial Division of the country 
showed, citizens in Macedonia remain passive concerning public life and policymak-
ing until their direct interests are threatened. This situation has to be changed if the 
country is to have solid local governance and budget management. The citizens need to 
have a clear idea that public oﬃcials are paid by public tax money to provide requested 
services. The Macedonian experience in budget processing in local government units 
shows that the only viable policy alternative would be to engage the local population 
and the civil sector more directly.
5. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 
 MUNICIPALITIES OF GOSTIVAR AND ŠTIP
This chapter argues in favor of an active policy for a more direct engagement of the local 
population and the civil sector in local governance. The goal of this policy is to have 
local authorities improve transparency and public involvement in the budgetary process. 
Thus the following recommendations aim at concrete measures for the enhancement of 
budgetary monitoring on the municipal level. Local governance and the budget process 
have been largely unchecked endeavors in Macedonian political life. Citizens are pas-
sive and the political culture discourages the direct involvement of concerned citizens 
in the budgetary processes. Therefore, it is vital to adopt measures to increase public 
information and citizen participation in the key areas of local ﬁnances and local public 
services. One should keep in mind that clarity in the roles and the responsibilities in 
the management of public ﬁnances is essential to citizens’ capacity to hold government 
accountable for budget policy and decisions.
Recommendation 1:
Public availability of budget monitoring 
A fundamental requirement of ﬁscal transparency is that comprehensive, reliable, and 
useful budget information is made available. Civil society must have the opportunity to 
inﬂuence budget formation and assess whether government undertook what it planned. 
Civil associations or nongovernmental organizations should have the opportunity to 
undertake monitoring of the budget’s execution on the subnational level. The Law on 
Financing the Local Government Units should include clear provisions guaranteeing 
continuous and permanent access by citizens to local ﬁnancial information. It should 
provide for clear obligations on the part of local government units to disseminate 
information about the budget’s execution among the public, to keep a ﬁle of the budget 
accessible to the public in the local government unit, and to organize quarterly open 
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sessions for public overview of the budget’s execution in the municipality. The income 
and the expense statements and the balance sheet should be published and made ac-
cessible to interested citizens. 
Although the municipality of Gostivar has published its 2002 budget (and programs), 
there is no speciﬁc provision in any law that states clearly that such documents must 
be published and that the public must have access to this information. The assumption 
is that only a few of the existing municipalities have such a practice and this needs to 
change. Therefore, the law should stipulate that, on the part of the local authorities, 
there is a proactive approach to transparency, with information made available in reports 
and on websites. The law should provide for suﬃcient human resources being allocated 
to process information requests by interested parties in budget monitoring, that local 
government staﬀ is trained to deal courteously with the public, and that there are trained 
oﬃcials who oversee information requests and ensure they are answered.
Recommendation 2: 
Influencing the budget formation process
A key issue is whether the legislature and civil society are able to participate eﬀectively 
in the budget process. Eﬀective participation refers to the opportunities for the legis-
lature and civil society to make their viewpoints known and to have these views taken 
seriously. Therefore, the law should require that the units of local self-government hold 
public hearings before adopting key decisions, such as the annual budget or changes in 
the fees for local public services. There should be ample advance notice accompanied 
by publication or public access to relevant documents. In fact, the possibility of public 
hearings was included in the draft version of the Law on Financing Local Government 
Units.7 The Law was discussed at a government session on December 10, 2003, and the 
draft text was changed not to include the obligation for the local governments to hold 
public hearings for the budget. Since this was already discussed, an amendment to the 
law including the obligation on public hearings should not be a signiﬁcant change of 
the legal system.
Recommendation 3:
General provisions helping budgetary oversight on the subnational level: 
Access to Information Law
At the moment Macedonia lacks an access to information law. Many of the problems 
with transparency in governance, including budget monitoring, would be solved if a 
freedom of information law would be adopted. The Macedonian chapter of Transparency 
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International, together with other local NGOs, has initiated an access to information 
law that is expected to be adopted by the Assembly by the end of 2005. The draft ver-
sion of the law stipulates that citizens will have a right to obtain information on “the 
services public oﬃcials provide and the organization, the competencies and the costs 
of working” (Center for Research of Economic Policies 2005: 2). This implies that the 
ﬁnancial management and the budgeting process of subnational governments will, by 
a speciﬁc law, become open to public scrutiny. Such a law will not only help curb cor-
ruption in Macedonia but also make budgetary monitoring of the local government 
units much easier as it will directly empower ordinary citizens dealing with institutions 
that now seem distant and all too powerful. 
6. APPENDICES
6.1 Participation 
At the moment Macedonian citizens hardly participate in the budgetary process on the 
subnational level. As examples from Štip and Gostivar show, this issue is not on the 
agenda of citizens groups and nongovernmental organizations. Within the legal frame-
work, there is no mention of the possibilities for citizens’ involvement in the budgetary 
process. Decentralization and the transfer of competencies to the local authorities do 
not directly provide legal tools for the involvement of citizens in the budgetary process. 
Budget monitoring is determined to be the obligation of the Ministry of Finance and 
the State Audit Oﬃce, with future internal audit units within the local government 
units taking over some of the responsibilities. However, the legislation does not preclude 
local governments’ budget monitoring by concerned citizens either. On the contrary, 
a number of legal provisions from the Law on Local Self-government can be seen as 
encouraging such actions. According to the Constitution and the Law on Local Self-
government, the units of local self-government have the right to local self-governance 
through direct participation of citizens in decisions about common matters. Moreo-
ver, Article 115, Paragraph 1 of this law stipulates that “citizens directly and through 
representatives participate in decision-making on issues of local relevance particularly 
in the ﬁeld of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, 
local economic development, local ﬁnances, communal activities, culture, sport, social 
security and child care, education, primary health care and other ﬁelds determined by 
law” (emphasis added). These legal provisions, although they do not directly provide 
for the possibility for budget supervision on a local level, ensure the legal background 
for such activity. At the moment there are no institutional arrangements for citizens’ 
participation.
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6.2 Information
The study reveals that data are available on ad hoc basis depending on the managerial 
vision of the local government of the municipalities. Considering the examples from 
Štip and Gostivar, and consulting the study of municipal debt, the data can be judged 
to be unreliable. Data on the budgets of local government units is not produced in a 
timely fashion. It is not possible to compare actual versus planned ﬁgures of the local 
government units at the moment.
6.3 Accountability
Until the reform of this year, budgets on the subnational level were drafted without 
much concern for accountability. As the country was overcentralized, the local govern-
ment units were left to deal with important development issues for the municipalities 
without recourse to suﬃcient funding. Many municipalities ran into debts and had 
to ﬁnd extralegal means to manage their work. As a result, the transparency of budget 
preparation and execution and accountability were not issues of concern to the local 
governments while the central authorities tolerated the state of aﬀairs, aware that citizens 
require their basic needs to be fulﬁlled on the local level.
ENDNOTES
1  On the conﬂict and the Ohrid Agreement which ended the violence between Albanian rebels 
and Macedonian security forces by introducing legislative reforms improving the status of Mac-
edonian Albanians, see Daskalovski (2004). 
2 More precisely, three percent of the personal income tax on the salaries of employed people, 
collected in the municipality in which they are registered as having the permanent place of resi-
dence, and 100 percent of the personal income tax from individuals dealing with craftsmanship, 
registered on the territory of the municipality in which they are registered to perform activity.
3 EUR 1 is worth MKD 61.
4 A total of nine interviews with stakeholders within the municipality of Štip including the mayor, 
Mr. Dimitar Efremov, were held in the period October 2004–January 2005.
5 A list of Štip NGOs is available at http://www.ngocenters.org.mk/nvo.asp?lang=mak&grad=2. 
An extended list of the Štip NGOs with contact addresses and telephone numbers is on ﬁle 
with the author.
6 The report is on ﬁle with the author.
7 See Local Government Reform Project, Quarterly Report, 2003, Q4, by Democratic Alternatives 
Inc., pp. 11–13.
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Budgetary Oversight and Accountability 
in Ukraine: The Case of 
General Secondary Education
Sergii Slukhai
This paper deals with issues of budgetary oversight and accountability in the ﬁeld of 
secondary education. Based on the case of Ukraine, the paper analyzes the state of 
general budgetary oversight on the local level and goes into detail concerning ﬁscal 
accountability of educational units. It is argued that the most striking feature of 
Ukrainian budgetary oversight on the local level is the dominant role of the state bod-
ies involved and a very minor role attributed to the customers of educational services. 
In order to change this unjustiﬁed bias, a series of policies is proposed, aimed at 
decentralization of the educational sector, its institutionalization, and raising the level 
of self-governance of the school units.
1. INTRODUCTION
Education plays a growing role in the modern post-industrial society in Ukraine. It 
is one of the most important inputs that predetermines not only the current state of 
aﬀairs in the economy, but is decisive for the country’s prospect in the global economic 
environment and its democratic development. Because of the speciﬁc nature of education 
(in general, a private good that creates a huge ﬂow of positive externalities) policy cannot 
be left to market forces alone because the latter cannot guarantee a suﬃcient level of 
education in society. 
Secondary education is a signiﬁcant cornerstone of the educational system in 
Ukraine.1 As a public responsibility, it is more or less decentralized, creating one of 
the most extensive local government tasks. The latter fact is due to both economic and 
political reasons: decentralization in this ﬁeld makes service provision more eﬃcient 
and gives the local community more power in decision-making regarding issues of local 
concern to which secondary education belongs.
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Thus, local authorities providing secondary education are fulﬁlling a very impor-
tant social task. Because of this they have to be the subject of public oversight and 
accountable to their communities about how they use scarce public money to satisfy 
the public’s need.
Making government accountable to the people is one of the most challenging issues 
in post-socialist countries. The traditions of centralism, under which all the issues of 
public importance should be resolved only on the national level, have gone. The most 
important values of local self-government like democracy (participation), autonomy 
(being more or less independent from the central state), and eﬀectiveness (closest match 
between public good supply and demand) are spreading over the Central and East 
European countries or CEECs (Swianiewicz 2001). But in the post-Soviet world many 
obsolete traditions of the command economy in the public sector are still present. This 
is also true for Ukraine. These traditions persist in such an important sector of public 
service delivery as secondary education.
The issue of public involvement into the budgetary process has its own peculiarities 
in each sphere of public good provision. One of the most critical and controversial issues 
emerges in secondary education, which is in its essential features a local responsibil-
ity in Ukraine. Like in many other post-socialist countries,2 Ukraine still suﬀers from 
overpowering governmental regulations of educational ﬁnance, which creates many 
economic distortions and interregional inequalities that require treatment (IRF/UNDP 
Ukraine 2001, Levitas and Gerczinski 2001, ISTC 2004b). Community involvement 
in forming educational budgets is very low. It is partly so because in many locations the 
community spirit is still weak and partly because of the extensive and direct involve-
ment of the state in educational policy on the local level. Some compromise should be 
found between the demand for state supervision over mandated public spending on 
education, on the one hand, and possibilities of public service consumers to inﬂuence 
the level and quality of educational service rendering, on the other.  
This paper aims to outline the eﬀective policy concerning enhancing local account-
ability with special regard to secondary education. To accomplish this goal, the following 
objectives are stated: (i) to identify public needs for accountability in the local budgeting 
process; (ii) to compile an inventory of current critical issues in public policy concern-
ing oversight over local ﬁnance in Ukraine, speciﬁcally emphasizing general secondary 
education; (iii) to develop public policy options intended for enhancing local budgetary 
accountability in the education branch.
The ﬁndings of this paper could be summarized in the following way: the public’s 
inclusion in the oversight of educational expenditures is low in Ukraine despite the great 
importance of educational services for community life; the state’s budgetary oversight 
is biased to control the legality of money usage rather than eﬃciency; the core mecha-
nism of securing a higher level of public involvement could be the decentralization of 
educational administration accompanied by the higher level of school self-government 
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and responsibility of unit managers. These ﬁndings are supported by relevant studies 
of other researchers and proved by success stories from countries currently engaged in 
education decentralization (Cohen and Slukhai 2004, ISTC 2004a, Levitas and Gerc-
zinski 2001, Lukovenko 2004).
2. CURRENT STATE AND CORE PROBLEMS OF 
 BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
As school budgets are an integral part of local budgets, they are, as any other budgetary 
activity, the subject of budgetary control. In general, the authority for budget supervision 
in Ukraine is given to the central government, which has a broad range of controlling 
bodies at its disposal. 
2.1 Budget Supervision: General Background
According to the Constitution of Ukraine, the central government bears most of the 
responsibility for the delivery of public services including secondary education. The 
majority of local authorities are still far from taking over the role of self-reliant public 
service providers that could meet the local voters’ preferences. The most inﬂuential bod-
ies on the local level are local state administrations responsible for the delivery of many 
basic public services, leaving some miscellaneous ones in the domain of locally elected 
bodies. As a matter of fact, weak popular demands for independent local authorities 
and the long-lasting traditions of a centralized state have created a very weak demand 
for shifting more power from the top to the bottom. Despite a piece of real power, the 
municipal bodies of big cities recently might have gained in the course of ongoing re-
forms, even in these rare cases the local authorities have not become really accountable 
and ﬁscally independent.
Since the adoption of the Budget Code in 2001, new possibilities for fostering local 
accountability have arisen. But there is still a long way to go before some innovations 
are implemented in real life and before the reform brings results: raising the eﬃciency 
of local governance and involving people in decision-making at the local level. Local 
governments that have gained more power need to be monitored in order to test the 
compliance of their policies with national ones.
As independent scholars have reported, transparency has been greatly improved 
on the national level since independence (Sundakov 2001), but the situation with the 
execution of local budgets seems to be much more problematic (IER 2003). However, 
empirical evidence suggests that on the local level some problems associated with trans-
parency and public involvement in budgetary decision-making really exist. The current 
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composition of the local government system, characterized by the concentration of 
most operations of budgetary units subordinated to local governments in the central 
government local bureaus, moves public funding in many ways outside the inﬂuence 
of people who are the most interested in their operation. The main concern of the local 
populace is to gain more inﬂuence on public-spending decision-making and to make 
local governments accountable not only to the central government, but also (if not 
mostly) to local voters.
This is especially true for the educational budgets that comprise the dominant part 
of the budgets of self-governing territorial units.
2.2 Control over Local Budgetary Activity
The budget process at the local level consists of the following main stages: drafting, hear-
ing, approval, execution, monitoring, and reporting. Formally, each stage could involve 
local inhabitants with budget issues. However, the real possibilities of inﬂuencing the 
budget process from the people’s side are quite limited.
The problem here lies in the factual formation of local budgets that gives no space 
for public involvement. According to Article 75 of the Budget Code, local budgets 
are formed from top to bottom; in their main features they are replicas of the Soviet-
type budgeting process. First, the local authorities should submit information con-
cerning their ﬁscal capacity and ﬁscal needs; then the main budget money disposers 
should prepare the budget requests that are then submitted to the local ﬁscal au-
thorities (local departments of the Ministry of Finance), which then decide upon 
including what requests into the budget draft of the oblasts (regions) or districts. The 
local governments of villages, settlements, and small cities have to submit the budget 
drafts to their respective ﬁscal authorities. After the state budget draft has been ap-
proved by the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Finance delivers the calculation of 
the main ﬁscal measures for drafting of their budgets to oblast, district, and large city 
authorities. Once the annual budget law has been adopted, the local authorities receive 
detailed information on the main parameters of their budgets; only then do the oblast 
and district authorities compose the drafts of the budgets of the local self-governments. 
So, we cannot speak about signiﬁcant independence within the local budgeting process. 
The problem is aggravated by the real level of local budgetary discretion.
According to the common understanding shared by Ukrainian scholars of the public 
sector, the proclaimed independence of the local government budgets does not work for 
two main reasons: (i) a very high portion of exogenous factors determine local expendi-
ture decisions—95 percent of local government expenditure competence belongs to the 
delegated powers, whose level of funding is determined by the state (Lunina 2002); 
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(ii) low revenue independence—the local taxes and duties comprise a very low portion 
of local budget revenues (around two percent in aggregated terms, see Table A1 in the 
Annex). Thus, explicitly, there is no reason for local oﬃcials to discuss expenditure 
programs of local budgets with the public because they are predetermined by the state 
in their chief components, both on the revenue and expenditure side.
All in all, the state bodies are mostly interested in controlling local spending decisions 
because local governments are assumed to perform state functions on the local level.
According to legislation, the bodies of the upper governmental level execute the 
obligation to oversee the execution of the subordinated governmental local budgets. 
The following bodies could execute external control over local government budget 
activities: the Accounting Oﬃce, the Ministry of Finance, the State Treasury, and the 
State Control and Revision Service. Their authorities in executing budgetary control 
are itemized in the Table A2 in the Annex.
The above-mentioned authorities, especially local State Treasury departments and 
the State Control and Revision Service have a broadly deﬁned authority to directly 
inﬂuence the local usage of public money. Since all the accounts of local governments 
and budgetary units could be held exclusively in State Treasury departments, the latter 
ones do not only monitor the revenue side of local budgets, but also give permits to 
use the money even in case when they are not dedicated to the execution of delegated 
state functions. The funding of local expenditure programs should be done exclusively 
in compliance with the approved budget by a respective representative council that 
formally guarantees the targeted usage of money.
The misuse of public moneys could be considered to be a budget oﬀence. As the 
Budget Code provides, this is the case when someone does not obey rules provided by 
Budget Code and other legal acts concerning composing, reading, approval, amend-
ment, execution, and reporting of the budget. In case an oﬀence does take place, there 
are reasons for the budget process participants—like the Ministry of Finance, the State 
Treasury, the State Control and Revision Service, local ﬁscal departments, heads of 
local authorities or key spending units—to stop budgetary appropriations for any local 
government. The reasons could be akin to: untimely reporting; not obeying the rules in 
accounting, reporting, or internal auditing; breaking the order of payments; delivering 
false information on budget execution; breaking the rules concerning executing budgetary 
obligations; and inappropriate use of budgetary costs (i.e., not in compliance with the 
tasks). The penalties for budget oﬀences could range from administrative penalties for 
the guilty administrators and suspension of budgetary appropriations, up to criminal 
proceedings against the local oﬃcials involved.
The internal ﬁscal control of the local bodies should be performed at each stage of 
the budgetary process. Its main function is to secure a permanent estimate of suﬃciency 
and compliance of budgetary institution activity to legal requirements; evaluation of 
relation between results, tasks, and plans; and informing the manager of a budgetary 
institution about results of an internal audit. 
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The local legislatures (radas) audit the execution of budgets approved by them, 
and the legitimacy of the usage of reserve funds. They also control compliance of the 
budgets, budget allocations, and cost estimates of subordinated territorial units with 
budget legislation.
The public participation in budgetary oversight could be estimated as quite weak. 
However, there exists a more or less satisfactory legislative basis for granting public 
inﬂuence over local spending decisions. 
As one recent study of public ﬁnance transparency in Ukraine stated, the following 
problems illustrate the above statement:
 • There is no public access to information concerning budget hearings (the budget 
drafts are usually neither published nor posted on the Internet);
 • No disaggregated information concerning the execution of local government 
budgets is published;
 • There is no detailed information on current budget execution delivered to the 
public (it is at an oﬃcial’s discretion to deliver some information on budget 
execution or not);
 • No information concerning debt obligations is open (the local authorities dis-
close this information only to the Ministry of Finance and State Treasury);
 • No information on municipal property and assets, their usage, market value, 
and performance of communal enterprises is available (IER 2003).
This makes us conclude the following: there is a severe problem with accountability 
of the state in general and of local government in particular. The current state of aﬀairs 
is inherited from the Soviet past, when the citizenry was excluded from active partici-
pation in public issues, taking for granted the fact that all the issues will be dealt with 
correctly by the oﬃcials appointed (as a matter of fact) by the Communist Party based 
on ideological motives. Now, neither the public is ready to actively participate in local 
decision-making, nor local oﬃcials ready to allow the public to be present at each stage 
of the budget process (Zaharchenko 2002).
After the revolutionary events in 2004, Ukraine revealed its democratic potential. 
After this turning point, the issue of accountability at the local level cannot stay as before. 
Public participation will inevitably increase in all ﬁelds of social life.
2.3 What to Control: Educational Tasks of the 
 Local Governments and Their Funding
As stated above, education is one of the most important responsibilities of local gov-
ernments, which is delegated to them by the state. The data in Table 1 measures the 
local government share in educational expenditures that is as high as two-thirds of total 
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public expenditures on this function. According to the data presented, education looks 
like a shared function; the speciﬁc tasks of the local government of diﬀerent level and 
the funding associated with those tasks are presented in Box 1. 
Table 1.
Subnational expenditures by function within a sector of public administration [%]
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expenditures
1992 100 62.2 37.8 11.5 7.7 15.5 0.7 0.7 1.7
2002 100 58.9 41.1 11.1 11.7 15.4 0.6 0.7 1.7
Education 1992 100 33.9 66.1 6.6 17.0 28.1 3.0 3.1 8.3
2002 100 40.7 59.3 7.9 23.8 22.5 1.5 1.4 2.2
Source: Author’s calculation based on MoF data.
The breakdown of educational expenditures shows that the expenditures on 
secondary education are the most important type of educational expenditures that 
local governments bear. As Table 2 demonstrates, they have nominally more than 
doubled within the last four years (with an inﬂation rate of about 35 percent during 
this time period, it implies a real growth in this expenditure category), and currently 
they comprise more than 60 percent of the educational budget of the aggregated local 
government sector.
General secondary education in Ukraine is a state function, the implementation of 
which is delegated to the local authorities. On the district level, the local state adminis-
tration bears the responsibility for general school administration; in its structure it has 
local educational authorities to which all the schools are subordinated; in large cities of 
national and oblast signiﬁcance, the task of secondary education delivery is performed 
by the educational authorities of self-government bodies (city councils). Although the 
Ministry of Education and Science (further referred to as the Ministry of Education) is 
at the top of the administrative hierarchy in school education, it has no direct inﬂuence 
on school funding, where the Ministry of Finance has the upper hand. The Ministry 
of Education deals mainly with content of education; all the ﬁscal issues, even the 
calculation of local expenditures on education, belong to the domain of the Ministry 
of Finance and its local departments. Concerning budgeting issues, the Ministry of 
Education does not play any signiﬁcant role, unlike in Poland which, as a neighboring 
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country, serves in many cases as a relevant example for Ukraine.3 Also signiﬁcantly, it 
collects no information of school ﬁscal well-being, relying in this matter on local state 
administration ﬁscal departments.
Table 2.
Composition of local educational expenditures in Ukraine
Type of expenditures 1999 2003
[UAH million] [%] [UAH million] [%]
Education total 3,471 100.0 8,985 100.0
Preschool education 567 16.3 1,636 18.2
General secondary education 2,156 62.1 5,457 60.7
Educational institutions for those who 
need social care and rehabilitation
321 9.2 815 9.1
Extracurricular education 113 3.3 300 3.3
Vocational schools 19 0.5 36 0.4
Higher education 106 3.1 262 2.9
Post-diploma training 23 0.7 60 0.7
Source: MoF 2002, 2004.
Small cities and rural settlements run preschool education and elementary schools 
(schools, kindergartens); they are also responsible for funding these institutions. In some 
districts secondary schools are also funded by local urban and rural communities, and 
despite the Budget Code provisions, there is no uniformity in practice. In rural areas, 
the district educational authorities bear responsibility for secondary education services. 
The detailed information on assignment of expenditures on education is shown in 
Box 1. Here, it is obvious that the educational expenditure assignment is supposed to 
beneﬁt areas of each type of service in order to minimize spillovers. In order to make 
ﬁscal ﬂows more transparent, funding educational establishments from the budgets of 
diﬀerent levels is prohibited; so only one channel of funding is available for a separate 
school unit. 
The funding of secondary education is performed by district governments (or by 
the city government in case of a big city) from the bunch of national state revenues 
ceded to them. Standardized expenditures on secondary education are also subjected to 
ﬁscal equalization, included in the equalization formula since ﬁscal year 2001 (CMU 
2000, items 40–46).
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Box 1.
Local government responsibilities for carrying out 
the educational expenditures, according to the Budget Code
Regional (oblast) level: specialized secondary education for disadvantaged students; sec-
ondary boarding schools; vocational and higher education establishments.
Cities of district significance and rural districts: general secondary education. 
Towns, villages, and settlements: preschool education. 
Cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol undertake all of the expenditure responsibilities that have 
been assigned to oblasts, cities and districts, towns, villages and settlements with regard 
to the special status of these territorial-administrative units.
Notes: All these educational expenditures will be included while calculating the sums of intergovernmental 
cash transfers. 
  Own expenditures of local governments (to be excluded while calculating intergovernmental cash 
transfers) extend over extracurricular education.
The planning of school funding occurs in conformity with educational norms (aca-
demic programs for each grade) set by the Ministry of Education and budgetary norms 
ﬁxed by the national Cabinet of Ministers for each year. School headmasters comprise 
a cost estimate for the running of their schools for the budget year based on current 
funding norms; district authorities review the estimate, and after approval it becomes a 
part of the district budget. In fact, oﬃcial school budgets consist mainly of two secured 
items—staﬀ salaries and heating expenditures (about 90 percent of the total). The other 
expenditures are usually discretional ones—the district educational authority distributes 
them among school units according to ad hoc arrangements. 
The budgets of schools, granted to them by district authorities, are very tight and 
compel school managers to seek extra-budgetary funding; but the most important part 
of extra-budgetary sources comes through informal arrangements, like parental cash 
payments and in-kind contributions which, according to some studies, could comprise 
up to 15 percent of an eﬀective school’s budget (ISTC 2004b).
In general, the level of school autonomy in Ukraine is strictly limited: most schools 
have no accountants (even utility bills are paid by district authorities), and thus have 
no special interest in attracting oﬀ-budget funding in an oﬃcial way according to the 
list approved by the government (CMU 1997).
As budgetary units, school establishments are the subjects of budgetary control and 
supervision. The school outlays, being a part of district budget, are strictly controlled 
by the ﬁscal authorities on the district level and by the State Control and Revision 
Service.
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The local ﬁscal authorities endorse only the outlays that are recorded in the school 
cost estimate for the running year. Even if a school master managed to get additional 
private support to cover some urgent outlays, he cannot deliberately adjust the school 
estimate, in case this money and expenses are not planned for this year. Changing a 
school cost estimate could be possible only after making adjustments in the district 
budget and will take a lot of time because only a session of the district council has the 
authority to adopt any changes in its budget.
Being a part of district budget, school budgets are subjected to general ﬁscal control 
according to the criteria indicated above. The regulation of revisions in educational 
establishments emphasizes the following subjects of special treatment: 
 • cost of additional educational services, revenues from property lease;
 • cost calculation on production of goods and services, calculation of revenues 
from commercial activities of educational establishments;
 • recording, accounting, and usage of humanitarian aid;
 • accounting of parental payments;
 • targeted usage of money for children’s health improvement;
 • targeted usage of money for school computerization;
 • usage of money for children’s nourishment (SCRS 2004). 
From this list it has become obvious that the State Control and Revision Service 
is strongly motivated to monitor the legality of money usage by schools. But it is out 
of its responsibility to check whether public funding is spent in the most eﬃcient way. 
This formal approach is also characteristic for other state agencies involved in budget 
supervision.
Summarizing the above, one could state that local governments have a very small 
opportunity and a low capacity to do something in order to meet local demand. 
Local governments’ responsibilities in secondary education are very high in terms 
of obligations, and very low in terms of rights. Article 11 of the Law on Education 
defends the monopoly of the Ministry of Education in decision-making and policy-
making, but at the same time vests a great part of responsibilities onto local govern-
ments. Municipalities fulﬁll delegated responsibilities of the central government and 
maintain school infrastructure, while the Ministry of Education determines academic 
load, teaching material, salaries, and hires and ﬁres administrative staﬀ (see detailed 
information in Table A3). School entities are seriously limited in their right to use 
public money and have no possibility to be ﬂexible and responsive to changes in local 
demands for educational services because they even cannot change the funds allotment 
between cost estimate articles (it requires some changes in the rayon budget and cannot 
be done easily or quickly). 
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2.4 Who is who in school education funding?
From the point of view of economic eﬃciency, the intensity of public concern in using 
money on public services is determined by the allocation of beneﬁts and costs between 
stakeholders. The best result in using public money will be observed in a situation 
when the beneﬁciaries are the same persons as the cost-bearers. The more diﬀerences 
are observed between beneﬁciaries and payers, the farther service delivery will be from 
an eﬃcient amount.  
The main participants on the supply side of educational service are the state (which 
is obliged to guarantee the access to secondary education for each citizen); the state 
educational authorities (mainly state administrations of the district level); and the 
schools (primarily service providers). The state authorities are interested in receiving a 
due amount of money to fund public services on the territory of their jurisdiction. But 
there may be several obstacles that make the budgeting process ineﬀective.
At the moment, on the national level the trade-oﬀ between educational expenditures 
and other types of expenditures like social beneﬁts does not favor school education. 
Real school expenditures have signiﬁcantly decreased during the last decade; the por-
tion of educational expenditures in GDP—5.7 percent (MoF 2004)—is below the level 
necessary for remaining a well-educated nation, because educational expenditures are 
dedicated to (almost exclusively) salary payments. It looks like education does not yet 
belong to the top priorities of the state.
The state distributes educational money in the following way. The normative per 
student educational expenditures are included in the calculation of normative expen-
ditures of local government and are taken into account while calculating equalization 
transfers. On the district and city level, the bunch of ceded state revenues dedicated 
to funding delegated functions is then allocated between these functions. There exists 
some minimum of educational expenditures determined by the so-called “secured 
budget items” that should be funded in any case: teacher salaries and school heating 
expenditures belong to these.
According to information gained from our previous ﬁeld research (AUF 2003), in 
general, the total amount of delegated function or earmarked funding is not suﬃcient 
for maintaining an appropriate public service level. This is especially the case on the 
district level, where the total budget money is apportioned among separate needs. The 
evidence from mayors of small cities that are subordinated to the district authorities 
shows that the latter ones are not eager to allocate public money in favor of education; 
school education belongs to underﬁnanced branches of delegated functions at this gov-
ernmental level. As we can see from the Table A4, which contains the estimates on actual 
funding rates as compared to ﬁscal need, on average, the percentage of actual secondary 
education funding extends only 68 percent in a sample of the cities surveyed.
80
M A K I N G  P U B L I C  F I N A N C E  P U B L I C
The lobbying power of local educational departments of state administration and 
teachers’ community is not strong enough to defend the interests of the educational 
branch on the district level. That is why we can have widely varying amounts of actual 
per student expenditures throughout the country.
State educational authorities, upon receiving the educational budget adopted 
by the district council, adjust the schools’ cost estimates submitted for the preparation 
of the district budget. They have to fund ﬁxed items of these estimates (ﬁrst of all, 
teacher salaries and heating costs), but the residuum of state funding (about 10 percent 
of the educational budget) is assigned among schools in a very non-transparent way. 
We may conclude that district educational authorities joined with teacher commu-
nities and local communities in order to defend the existing level of funding without 
regard to cost eﬃciency. On the macro level, it is reﬂected in the following facts: dur-
ing the last decade, despite declining student enrollment, the number of teachers has 
increased (which resulted in an improved student/teacher ratio), and the number of 
secondary schools has remained almost the same (IPT 2002).  
The school administration is supposed to be responsible for the quality of educational 
services, but in the current situation concerning teaching staﬀ and physical assets, it is 
almost impossible to guarantee high-quality services. For example, even some schools of 
the third level in Sokal district do not have PCs; none out of 70 schools have Internet 
access. Thus administrators’ activity in terms of funding concentrates mainly on lobbying 
interests of the school they administer; whoever has better connections to the district 
authorities receives more generous funding and better equipment.
The local communities in small cities, settlements, and villages seem to have a long-
term interest in school education—the graduates will work for the prosperity of the 
locality. But from the short-term perspective, they usually do not care too much about 
schools because they do not belong directly to their jurisdiction.
 The business community is interested in a pool of better-educated school graduates, 
but as the best students tend to go to universities and leave their communities, their 
interest in supporting education is quite low. Only large companies can aﬀord invest-
ing signiﬁcant money into schools; in general, the activity of local businesses in school 
support depends on the school headmaster’s image and persistence. 
Parents have their interest primarily in the eﬀective use of money allocated because 
they wish to have their children educated at the best level possible. This is especially true 
for the high school level. But, in general, they try to achieve this goal through personal 
eﬀorts that mostly are not directly connected to what is going on at school.
The above observations result in a very speciﬁc point of view that school head-
masters have of the main factors exerting an inﬂuence on school performance. 
As Table A6 demonstrates, the local community and parental participation are not 
the top priorities. They are not taken seriously as factors that can support school 
development. And the school headmasters are not to blame here—the problem is 
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rooted in a centralistic approach to the administrating and funding of secondary 
education. 
 The most important sphere, supported by polling results, is conducting classes 
and improving physical infrastructure, and the latter priorities are interests of parents 
and the local community and interaction with the local environment (including the 
business community). This reﬂects the common view of the school administration on 
external factors inﬂuencing school performance. Interestingly, of all the concerns, the 
most prioritized areas are the subjects of centralized funding and control. So in case of 
some problem, an administrator sees no sense in going public; the most eﬃcient way 
for him is to appeal to district authorities.
3. BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 IN SECONDARY EDUCATION: IS IT OF ANY VALUE?
The issue of budgetary oversight in secondary education from the point of view of civic 
society is undeveloped. One could ask a question here: well, the public is not involved, 
but the state is, so maybe we do not need to change the situation?
To answer this question requires pragmatism. If public oversight makes the local 
government and school unit more accountable, then some beneﬁts are gained in terms 
of better covering the local demand and more eﬃcient usage of public money. Since the 
degree of meeting the local demand is hardly measurable, economic eﬃciency becomes 
an issue. Some useful conclusions could prove the necessity of raising the standards of 
accountability.
Foreign experts have found a high diﬀerence in per student expenditures in Ukraine 
despite the fact that educational expenditures are calculated according to a formula-
based approach. These diﬀerentials cannot be attributed to any feasible factor (Levitas 
and Gerczinski 2001). Our own observations illustrated by Table A5 and Figure 1 
below show very signiﬁcant diﬀerences in per student school funding in the rural and 
urban areas.
From this ﬁgure it is evident that there are quite signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations of ex-
penditures per student, especially in small schools. The problem is that the funds are 
distributed according to the individualized estimates of ﬁscal need for each school. And 
the fact is that cost eﬃciency is not taken into consideration. The educational authori-
ties do not care too much about economic eﬃciency in service delivery and the state 
auditing bodies do the same. They are merely interested in spending money according 
to approved local budgets. As a result, each school receives enough money to maintain 
itself on a more or less suﬃcient level; the deviations are due to a low willingness on 
behalf of educational authorities to encourage eﬃciency and competition among edu-
cational units.
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Figure 1.
Correlation between total expenditures per student and school size 
in Sokal district, Lviv oblast
Source: Cohen and Slukhai (2004).
Secondly, there is some correlation between educational costs per student and school 
size: the bigger a school is the lower per student expenditures are. In other words, amal-
gamating schools could bring signiﬁcant cost economy that could be used for improving 
secondary education and enhancing the quality of education. 
Could these issues be resolved through some political measures on the local level? 
The answer is positive. If some arrangements will make local authorities more publicly 
responsible in spending public money, if school principals are given incentives to 
economize the educational expenditures, then sooner or later the positive results will 
be evident. Being accountable, local educational authorities will try to achieve better 
results given the funding amount. The school network would become more coherent 
and eﬃcient and the quality of education will be raised.
To understand the current situation we must see how the most motivated actors in 
education, parents and the local community, who should seek (from a logical point of 
view) a deeper insight into the budgeting of education, behave. The observation so far 
presumed indiﬀerence concerning budget oversight. Why?
In order to eﬀectively perform oversight over the school budget, there should be at 
least two prerequisites: formal arrangements to control the school budget and a strong 
motivation to execute the control function.
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Concerning the ﬁrst point, Ukrainian legislation creates formal grounds to 
control the ﬁscal activities of the school from the public side. The school board 
includes representatives of parental committees, the student community, and 
teaching staﬀ; the board has a right to control the ﬁscal activities performed by 
the school headmaster. But in reality, the school principal acts out of public control: 
a lot of his or her transactions belong to shadowy activities, and in fact he or she 
personally decides upon the usage of school money (of what extends over mandatory 
payments).
Concerning the second point, we must admit that parents have few possibilities of 
monitoring the school budget because they must be knowledgeable about school ﬁnance 
and have time to be involved in this issue. But the most important issue that prevents 
them from doing so is a common argument of economic theory concerning the public 
good. Public oversight is a public good for the parental community, but each parent 
who is involved must decide: whether it is worth trying to control the school principal 
concerning ﬁscal matters because there exists a high probability of conﬂict that will 
endanger their child’s prospects at the school, or it is better to be silent and merely nod 
in reﬂection to the headmaster’s “good” reports?
So, the main issues of public empowerment at the school level, like securing access 
to information, launching consultation, and securing participation in school policy-
making—the general issues of civil society functioning (Huntington 2002)—are at the 
moment not relevant for the vast majority of school establishments because of both 
objective and subjective reasons.
The local community might have more eﬀective control over the school budget 
because it represents a politically stronger group interest in comparison to the parental 
one. However, at the moment, its main concern is not the eﬀective use of scarce funds, 
but pushing local authorities to maintain the school establishment regardless of eﬃciency. 
Ministry of Education oﬃcially proclaimed that “No school will be closed,” so local 
authorities are very sensitive to the community voice in this matter. Closing a school 
has a high political cost, so it is in fact impossible to close a school with a decision based 
on economic reasons. The result of such policy is illustrated in Figure 2.  
Here, the school service unit—student weekly academic hour—is regressed to school 
size. As it turns out, the cost of educational service unit varies widely amongst schools 
of the same rayon—from UAH 400 to UAH 10. This is a true cost of “social fairness” 
in the ﬁeld of secondary education that really limits society’s possibilities of improv-
ing the state of secondary education. The highest service unit cost is observed in small 
schools of the ﬁrst level, which as a rule have bad conditions for rendering educational 
services. The most eﬃcient are the integrated schools combining educational levels from 
the ﬁrst though third. This calls for some policy of schools net optimization that should 
be performed on the rayon level.
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On the macro level, the problem is that educational authorities do not collect any 
information concerning school economy and have no idea about the amount of the 
existing schools’ net maintenance costs and whether this could be improved in any way. 
As a result, with educational capacities used, on average, at the level of 50 percent in 
rural localities, the rayon and oblast authorities each year apply for the building of new 
schools (and usually receive investment subsidies).
Figure 2.
Correlation between total cost to student weekly academic hour and school size
in Sokal district, Lviv oblast
Source: Cohen and Slukhai (2004).
The answer to what is the main reason for both direct consumers of education and 
local communities shying away from budget monitoring is easy: these expenditures are 
not paid directly from people’s wallets or community budget. If you do not pay, you 
have no choice but to get what is supplied, nothing more or less. 
4. HOW TO STRENGTHEN BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT AND
 ACCOUNTABILITY OF SECONDARY EDUCATION IN UKRAINE?
As the research in the previous chapters has shown, on the national level, there exists 
no policy concerning public empowerment in executing budget control in education 
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in Ukraine. The existing legal acts state the formal rights, but establish no mechanism 
for their realization. Also, the problem could not be solved by an additional legal act, 
let us say, “On public governance in education.” So, a complex policy should be de-
veloped that is directed mainly at the institutional strengthening of public governance 
in this sphere.
As the experience of some countries has shown, in order to build a better second-
ary education system, we need to change the old system, making school ﬁnance more 
transparent and accountable. This could be done based on principles enforced in the 
United Kingdom. These are: “per pupil funding, self-management by school boards 
and directors, highly publicized comparisons of examination performances and parental 
choice” (Davey 2002: 30). As a result of the implementation of such an approach in 
the UK, which launched intensive competition among schools, the overall quality of 
secondary education has been increased and even the schools with the worst perform-
ance have improved.
Another good example which proves that decentralization and school autonomy 
could bring very good results is delivered by New Zealand (Box 2). One can see that 
schools in New Zealand enjoy a high degree of ﬁscal independence and are required to 
perform in a ﬁscally sound way; the Ministry of Education is deeply involved in ﬁscal 
issues and does not give this responsibility away to the Ministry of Finance.
Box 2.
Secondary public school ﬁscal status and accountability in New Zealand
Each public school in this country holds its own bank account (it is free to choose bank 
institutions and change them) and receives its money directly from the government as well 
as from local sources (fees, community education fees, hire of facilities, trade, fundraising, 
and similar sources). The operational funding is decided on by the board of trustees, which 
is accountable for money usage before the national government. These funds consist of a 
per-pupil-grant (59 percent in total operational funding granted by the state) that has four 
funding levels according to cost of curriculum delivery and a bulk of earmarked subsidies 
(like relief teacher grant, Maori-language grant, facility maintenance grant, and others). 
Hence, the funding is based mainly on school enrollment, and that makes schools very 
sensitive to the number of students they have. This makes them compete and propose 
better curricula and better educational conditions.
 The board of trustees is responsible for setting priorities and managing the total 
funding. In doing so, “the board must meet the requirements of the National Education 
Guidelines, the National Administration Guidelines, their obligations as good employers 
and any legislative and contractual requirements to which they are subject.” They are also 
responsible for achieving the objectives specified in the school charter. The amount of 
state funding depends on the “School’s Decile Rating” which basically relates the funding 
to socio-economic development of the location to which the school belongs.
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 The board is fully and publicly accountable for the school’s financial and physical re-
sources (for allocation of funding among school priorities, control over school expenditures, 
and preparation and auditing of school reports) and reporting before the community and 
government. What is important here is the flexibility of the budget: in the course of a 
year the budget appropriations could be changed due to the emerging needs of a school. 
The school board has discretion to change the appropriations and the total school budget 
within a budgetary year.
 Schools are provided with a set of fiscal indicators, according to which the board and 
the school principal could monitor the financial status of the school and take the necessary 
steps in order to improve it. In case the school cannot manage the situation, the Ministry 
of Education intervenes.
 The board of trustees and senior school staff receive financial reports on a monthly basis 
prepared by accounting office. The school’s principal receives a detailed monthly report 
in order to take steps to improve the fiscal situation. Schools are supposed to prepare a 
report according to guidelines that are basically very similar to those for private entities. 
 Each year the school is required to submit an annual report to the Ministry of Education 
which is the subject of external auditing provided by the Office of the Auditor General.
Adapted from: New Zealand Ministry of Education 2005.
There is no question as to the fact that a key issue in achieving better budget moni-
toring in Ukrainian secondary education lies in the ﬁeld of its decentralization and 
restructuring of state oversight. So far, the policies proposed were never implemented. 
The following options below concerning the strengthening of budget oversight and 
public accountability seem feasible for secondary education.
4.1 New Paradigm of State Budgetary Oversight over Education
The current state oversight is mainly concerned with formal control and monitoring 
over school ﬁnance. Under such an approach, it is almost impossible for schools to have 
ﬂexibility and strive for eﬃciency. The state controlling agencies should be concentrated 
on eﬃciency and long-term sound ﬁscal management rather then formal oversight: 
whether the school ﬁscal transactions are done in line with legal requirements. This 
new paradigm requires changes in the current budgetary legislation and the passing of 
legislation on public ﬁnance reporting and auditing. The main function of state control-
ling bodies should be to assist in improving budget execution rather than searching for 
budget oﬀenses and punishing school managers. 
A signiﬁcant role in ﬁscal planning, budgeting, and monitoring should be assigned to 
the Ministry of Education. The current passiveness in this ﬁeld seems to be unjustiﬁed. 
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It should have a ﬁnancial department, a bureau of economic analysis, and staﬀ dealing 
with the monitoring and evaluation of schools’ ﬁscal performance.
4.2 Devolution of Secondary Education Function
The ultimate approach could be full decentralization of school education by making it 
a local responsibility with mixed funding from local revenues and state grants. Such an 
approach is, in general, compliant with the theoretical treatment of secondary education 
as a local public good, and, in general, gives far greater possibilities to communities to 
oversee the ﬁscal issues of school entities and to direct their function according to locally 
set priorities. But this contradicts the current constitutional provisions that assign this 
function to the state. Hence, it sounds quite good in theory, but is rather problematic 
to implement. 
Another possibility is the creation of separate school governments (school districts) 
that are accountable in ﬁscal issues both to the government and the local taxpayers. 
Then it will be natural for local community to decide whether they need two schools 
or only one in order to get more cost eﬃciency and a better quality of education. Thus, 
the creation of school districts, and granting them a signiﬁcant array of powers, could 
improve the situation with accountability.
There have been some steps in this direction since the Ministry of Education issued 
an order to experiment in creating school districts in several oblasts in 2004. However, in 
their current form these school districts look more like some additional administrative 
body with no special rights in managing ﬁnance. If implemented, such institution will 
not improve the ﬁscal soundness of the school system. The more promising approach is 
proposed by some NGOs, where the comprehensive system of administration, organiza-
tion, communication, and ﬁnance measures is put on the agenda (Lukovenko 2004). 
It may be argued that the decentralization process, the components of which have 
been proposed above, would create some problems for educational service delivery. Of 
course, there exists the risk that, under the condition of devolution, local governments 
will try to “cheat” and lower the funding of the educational function. This, in turn, 
may cause the further deterioration of secondary education. But this kind of behavior 
hardly seems possible. The case studies on educational funding performed in several 
CEECs have proved the opposite outcome of the decentralization process. It turns 
out that, under devolution, the expenditures on education grew in real terms and the 
schools became better funded and maintained in comparison to centralized systems still 
practiced in some CEECs (Davey 2002).
A favorable sign is the prospective territorial and administrative reform prepared by 
Ukrainian government that could be passed in the course of the year 2006, the essence 
of which advocates enlarging and integrating local government units. Such a develop-
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ment will improve the budgetary position of local governments and will allow devolving 
educational functions from rayon to the community level in rural areas.
4.3 School Autonomy
Proclaimed in the National Doctrine of Education Development (2002), school autono-
my still remains only a declaration. According to interviews with school administrators, 
most of them are willing to have more ﬁscal autonomy (i.e., to have an accountant, a 
bank account, to attract oﬀ-budget money to fund school outlays, to motivate teachers 
with performance bonuses from extra money the school attracts or saves), but the current 
administrative pressure and tight state ﬁscal control make this almost impossible. This is 
why most school directors are afraid to be autonomous. Similarly, rayon authorities would 
be unhappy to be freed from the previous functions in funding schools and managing 
ﬁscal ﬂows. According to common arguments of the economic theory of bureaucracy, 
each administrator does not seek to fulﬁll public expectations concerning service supply, 
but to get more command over the budget (Niskanen 1968).
Raising the level of school autonomy will bring immediate economic results because 
schools will become motivated to use funds more eﬃciently. Simultaneously, they need 
to become accountable for the money they use. To achieve this, we need to bring about 
some policy changes in both directions.
Regarding the ﬁrst course of action, schools should be granted budget autonomy 
and ﬂexibility. It involves giving them a right to choose a bank institution, to have an 
accounting oﬃce, to make reallocations among the budget articles within the budget-
ary year without the approval of the local government. Of course, not all schools are 
in the position to execute the above rights. The network of schools, especially in rural 
areas, is very fragmented and therefore needs some treatment. The institutionalization 
of school districts with a broad range of responsibilities could be a remedy here. But 
some integrated schools of ﬁrst through third educational level could execute these rights 
just now, without changing the school administration scheme.
Simple institutional measures could increase the accountability of the autonomous 
school units. The most important one could be changing the status of the school board 
and substituting it for a board of trustees, like in New Zealand. The board should be an 
independent body that consists mainly of highly respected citizens that have no personal 
concern in a particular school, have a degree of knowledge in the domain of public 
ﬁnance, and are willing to contribute to school performance. They could be representa-
tives of universities, local governments, and the business community. The rights of this 
board could be strengthened up to the dismissal of the school headmaster in the case 
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of the misuse of moneys or assets and deciding upon hiring and extra remuneration of 
teaching and service staﬀ as a result of school eﬃciency. 
The creation of school districts could be combined with the strengthening of school 
autonomy. It would be a mistake to merely substitute school district for rayon educational 
authority. Even if we leave the current administrative hierarchy, there are well-addressed 
courses of action to achieve a better use of public money through granting more discretion 
to the schools. If the funds among schools on the district level were allocated through 
a formula-based approach, then schools would have more freedom in the allocation 
of money according to their needs. It is necessary to develop certain methodological 
guidelines and to formulate rules for distributing funds for educational institutions at 
the local level. In this case, huge incentives will emerge for the school administration 
to eﬃciently use the money. This, in turn, together with granting broader rights in the 
use of budget money, might increase cost eﬃciency and stimulate everybody employed 
to look for possibilities to economize outlays.
4.4 Mode of Money Allocation 
The current approach to formula-based allocation of school money does not give much 
possibility to secure the appropriate funding of secondary education. The educational 
expenditures are only calculation measures that involve no funding obligations for the 
local government side except for mandatory outlays on teacher salaries, heating, and 
some miscellaneous needs like board for some categories of pupils. These items are 
funded in most cases. But a large diﬀerence among schools in terms of per-student 
expenditures and per-service-unit expenditures is caused to a great extent by this ap-
proach, currently in use in many countries. Here, it is worth mentioning that the Polish 
experience in school funding, similar to that of Ukraine, reveals a lot of problems and 
is criticized by experts.
In order to secure more adequate funding to schools and to make them more inde-
pendent from the good will of the respective local government, the following two steps 
could be taken: (1) allocate money for education at the rayon level as targeted funds, 
calculated on a formula basis, and that cannot be spent for other functions; (2) allocate 
money directly to schools based on some formulae. The latter approach seems to be more 
problematic since no institutional change will be undertaken. The former one has been 
introduced partly—the educational expenditures are calculated on a formula basis—but 
the problem is that this calculation remains only a calculation, not real funds. However, 
the second approach has been successfully practiced in some countries; the information 
on New Zealand above gives some guidelines of what might be done here. 
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4.5 Inter-school Competition
Launching competition could be a very attractive measure to improve performance of 
public sector units. This is also true for educational services. Such quasi-competition 
does exist now in urban areas where schools with better teaching staﬀ and equipment 
naturally attract more students, which causes the application of selection procedures 
and “voluntary” contributions to the school’s oﬀ-budget funds. In rural areas, such a 
possibility is highly restricted due to a small number of schools in a given location and 
the poor development of the transportation network. But there exist some measures 
to enforce competition through creating a mechanism of students’ “voting with their 
feet.” One such possible policy could be the introduction of tuition fees that will make 
schools try to attract more students by oﬀering better services. 
An eﬃcient way of reaching the highest beneﬁts from public money without intro-
ducing direct tuition in public schools could be a voucher system. At least in large cities 
where parents have a choice, it could create some kind of competition that automati-
cally will make a school try to propose educational services of higher quality and better 
conditions for learning. Mainly consumers will decide upon how much money to give 
to this school, not the educational authority.
5. WHO SHOULD DO WHAT AND WHEN REGARDING 
 THE BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
 SECONDARY EDUCATION?
In order to improve the situation, the following policy measures could be proposed:
 •  Changing the role of the Ministry of Education and Science. It should be re-
sponsible not only for the content of secondary education, but also for budgeting 
for the school entities. That is why it needs a structure with departments dealing 
with ﬁnancial analysis and monitoring. 
 •  The state controlling bodies should switch from monitoring the legality of ﬁscal 
transactions to ﬁscal analysis aimed at achieving a higher eﬃciency of resource 
usage. The functions of controlling and auditing state authorities also might 
be reassigned. The inspections should be performed on the basis of the annual 
school report submitted to a respective administrative body and should stress the 
development of a methodology of internal ﬁscal control and audit performed 
by schools themselves.
 •  The community should be more involved in decision-making at the school level. 
The main instrument should be the board of trustees who will be required to 
monitor school performance on a permanent basis. The community and school 
board should have access to ﬁnancial information in order to control the school 
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budgets. This calls for accountant oﬃces on the school level. In schools combin-
ing the ﬁrst through third level such a possibility already exists. 
 •  The school budgets should be published in local media and subjected to internal 
and external audit. This will enable communities and local NGOs to be well 
informed about the ﬁscal state of their respective educational establishments. 
 •  The functions of the rayon educational authority should be rearranged from 
the viewpoint of devolution of most of their power to school districts and au-
tonomous schools. Their responsibility should be mostly limited to educational 
inspections (mainly annual tests) and assistance to schools in improving the 
teaching process.
6. CONCLUSION
Present-day Ukrainian legislation does not provide a clear framework concerning the 
eﬀective use of public money. Schools are almost fully ﬁnancially sustained by district 
state authorities and have a cost-estimate instead of an independent budget.
The most important problems facing the ﬁnancing of the general education net-
work are: 
 •  an unclear process regarding the formation and usage of budgets of educational 
establishments, 
 •  an ineﬃcient use of public resources,
 •  the impossibility to use alternative sources of ﬁnancing to their full extent 
because of imperfections in the legislation, 
 •  schools and society in general are not ready for changes in the economic and 
political sphere, and they have not adapted themselves to the competitive en-
vironment,  
 •  the state is not yet in the position to grant suﬃcient stimuli for the alternative 
ﬁnancing of educational establishments, e.g., freeing private costs given away 
for education, of taxation.
The current legislation should be revised in order to increase the independence of 
educational establishments and also to strengthen the accountability of educational 
establishments and authorities to the public.
The core issue of budget oversight in Ukraine is the dominant role of the state bodies 
and the minor role of the public. The former is due to very high portion of delegated 
functions in local government activities; the latter is due to a low level of inﬂuence of 
general public on the level of school funding.
The main concern of state oversight is the “right” usage (from the point of view of 
the state) of public money rather than eﬃciency of its usage.
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Under the current conditions, there is no eﬀective mechanism that could guarantee 
the best possible usage of educational budgets both on the macro and micro levels.
The goal of the policy proposed in this paper is to increase the public participation 
in the school budget in order to gain more eﬃciency in educational service delivery. 
These policies are based on increasing the autonomy and responsibility of school units 
and change in the oversight functions of the state bodies.
The better choice for enhancing budgetary accountability would be the implemen-
tation of self-regulating mechanism on the school level combined with a normative 
formula-based approach in allocation of public money, as well as launching the elements 
of competition among schools, especially in large cities. This will raise not only school 
cost eﬃciency, but also the quality of education.
ENDNOTES
1 Secondary education in this paper stands for pupils from 6 to 17 years old. It combines three 
basic levels: elementary—ﬁrst level (grades 1 through 4), secondary—second level (5 through 
9) and high—third level (10 through 12).  Usually, urban schools have all three levels combined 
in one school unit; in rural areas one can ﬁnd schools of ﬁrst, ﬁrst and second, and ﬁrst through 
third level. 
2 A good overview of transitional educational economics is provided in Davey (2002).
3 In Poland, the Ministry of Education is very active in formation of educational budgets, per-
forming annually calculations of ﬁscal needs of the schools. Due to the nature of educational 
funding in Poland, the level of funding is formally not secured; but as a matter of fact, Polish 
local governments spend more on school education than is allocated to them in a process of ﬁscal 
equalization for this function (Rado 2004).
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ANNEX
7A Statistical Information on Local Budgets 
 and Oversight in Ukraine
Table A1.
Composition of subnational government revenues in Ukraine
Revenue type 1999 2003
[Million 
UAH]
[Million 
USD]
[Percent] [Million 
UAH]
[Million 
USD]
[Percent]
Tax revenues  10,962 2,654 55.26 18,195 3,414 54.6
Taxes on revenue, profit,  market 
value increase, including
7,935 1,921 40.0 13,369 2,508 40.1
 Personal income tax 3,111 753 15.7 13,210 2,478 39.6
 Enterprise profit tax 4,824 1,168 24.3 159 30 0.5
Property taxes             296 72 1.5 604 113 1.8
Local taxes and duties 442 107 2.2 595 112 1.8
Unified tax for small businesses 62 15 0.3 818 153 2.5
Non-tax revenues 552 134 2.8 2,231 419 6.7
Capital revenues 7 2 0.04 998 187 3.0
Earmarked funds 1,631 395 8.2 543 102 1.6
Revenues without transfers 13,152 3,185 66.3 21,968 4,122 65.9
Official transfers 2,942 712 33.7 11,355 2,130 34.1
Total revenues 16,095 3,897 100.0 33,323 6,252 100.0
Source: MoF 2000, 2004.
Note: Oﬃcial exchange rate UAH/USD for 1999 was 4.13, and for 2003 was 5.33. These rates are 
based on current exchange market rates that have been stable through the last three years.
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Table A2.
Powers of public agencies involved into external control 
over local government ﬁscal activities
Accounting Office Ministry of Finance
Audits use of budgetary funds dedicated to 
funding delegated responsibilities of local self-
government concerning both expenditures and 
revenues
Audits the compliance of local authorities’ 
decisions with budget legislation on each stage 
of budget process
State Treasury State Control and Revision Service
Performs accounting of proceeds and outlays 
of local budgets; enacts the unified rules of 
accounting and reporting concerning execution 
of local budgets and cost estimates, issues 
instructions on these matters and controls 
their implementation; controls the compliance 
of payments, obligations, and budget 
appropriations
Controls the targeting and effective usage of 
budgetary moneys on the local level; controls 
earmarked usage and timely repay of loans 
received under security of the Ukrainian 
Government; checks the obeying of rules of 
accounting performed and the reliability of 
reports concerning budget and cost-estimate 
execution; delivers information to local fiscal 
authorities concerning audits performed
Adapted from:  SEFR 2002, p. 150.
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Table A4.
Funding of delegated responsibilities in separate spheres as percentage of the need, 
according to the estimates of small city mayors, 2003
City (settlement) Oblast Function
Education Healthcare Social security
Bakhchisarai AR Crimea 58   
Borzna Chernihiv 70 70  
Boyarka Kyiv 46  30
Chervonozavodske Poltava 75 60  
Dolyna Ivano-Frankivsk 70   
Halych Ivano-Frankivsk 64  100
Hlobyne Poltava 62 100 85
Hola Prystan Kherson 75   
Horodenka Ivano-Frankivsk 64  100
Horodok Khmelnicki 74  2
Inkerman AR Crimea 50  40-50
Irshava Zakarpatska 90 70 50
Kaharlyk Kyiv 50   
Kalanchak Kherson 50   
Kobeliaky Poltava 85 90 95
Komarno Lviv 100 100 100
Kossiv Ivano-Frankivsk 100 80 90
Kostopil Rivne 95   
Nadvirna Ivano-Frankivsk 90   
Ovruch Zhytomyr 50  40
Petrovske Luhansk 90 80  
Pology Zaporizhzhia 50  50
Prymorsk Zaporizhzhia 70 70 50
Radomyshl Zhytomyr 75  50
Rohatyn Ivano-Frankivsk 50   
Sarny Rivne 52  60
Sniatyn Ivano-Frankivsk 65   
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City (settlement) Oblast Function
Education Healthcare Social security
Tlumach Ivano-Frankivsk 70   
Tsiurupinsk Kherson 50 100 20
Tysmenycia Ivano-Frankivsk 100   
Valky Kharkiv 52   
Vashkivci Chernivci 61 80  
Verkhnia Lanna Poltava 100 100 100
Vovchansk Kharkiv 60 99 33
Vyshgorod Kyiv 35  25
Zelenodolsk Dnipropetrovsk 60   
Zhydachiv Lviv 70  
Average 68 83 60
Source: AUF 2003.
Table A4 (continued)
Funding of delegated responsibilities in separate spheres as percentage of the need, 
according to the estimates of small city mayors, 2003
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Table A5.
Eﬃciency measures for urban schools combining the ﬁrst through third level, 
Sokal district, Lviv oblast
School Number of 
students
Total 
expenditures 
per student, 
UAH
Total 
expenditures 
per student 
relative to 
average level, 
percent
Total 
expenditures 
per student-
academic 
hour per 
week, UAH
Total 
expenditures 
per student-
academic 
hour per 
week relative 
to average 
level, percent
No. 4, Sokal 763 814.68 102 8.61 101
No. 2, Sokal 870 650.80 82 5.55 65
No. 3, Sokal 663 829.86 104 10.86 127
No. 5, Sokal 259 705.79 88 21.11 247
Sokal gymnasium 404 1,309.16 164 11.71 137
V. Mosty 1,023 669.40 84 5.87 69
Belz 533 829.64 104 10.75 126
Ugniv 226 911.95 114 30.54 358
Average 797.89 100 8.54 100
Source: Field study in Sokal district, Lviv oblast.
 
Table A6.
Average importance of activities determined by school headmasters 
in Velyki Mosty school cluster, Sokal district, Lviv oblast, 2004
Activities Respondents / Ratings Total Weight
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Classes 5 6 6 6 5 6 6 5 6 6 57 0.27
Extracurricular activity 6 4 4 2 3 2 4 1 4 2 32 0.15
Personnel 4 3 3 5 2 4 1 4 5 5 36 0.17
Physical infrastructure 1 5 5 4 6 3 5 6 3 4 42 0.20
Interaction with environment 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 17 0.08
Parental and communal concern 2 2 2 3 4 5 2 3 2 1 26 0.12
Total 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 210 1.00
Source: ISTS 2004c.
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7B Citizens’ Participation in Budget Oversight
Citizens’ participation in matters of local concern is regulated by a set of national leg-
islative acts: the Constitution (1996), the Law on Local Self-government (1997), and 
the Law on Bodies of Self-organization (2001) that proclaims the right to participate 
in issues of public importance. Article 5 of the Constitution says: “The people shall be 
the only source of power and sovereignty of Ukraine. The people shall exercise power 
directly and through state power bodies and local self-government bodies.” As some 
legal experts concluded, there exists also a problem of practical implementation of these 
constitutional norms into real life (Denisenko 2004).
The Law on Local Self-government vested to the local populace a right to issue 
initiatives that should be taken into consideration by the respective local government, 
to initiate public hearings (at least once a year), and to create self-organizing bodies 
with vested powers extending also over spending of budgetary moneys. Article 75 
stipulates that the local bodies and oﬃcials should be accountable to local community 
and are obliged to inform people about their activities, including budget execution 
at least twice a year, and delivering respective reports. The local community can stop 
at any time the authority of the bodies or oﬃcials, if they do not perform the vested 
obligations eﬃciently.
The Law on Bodies of Self-organization is especially important, since it institu-
tionalizes popular participation in governing local issues. The self-organizing bodies 
have an aim to make the inhabitants active in fostering socio-economic and cultural 
development of the territorial unit. They have a right to represent the popular stake in 
oﬃcial local public bodies and to activate direct forms of democracy through polling, 
meetings, local initiatives, and public hearings.
The analysis of the legal basis of popular participation in issues of local concern 
makes some scholars conclude that “this legislation is the most advanced one in Ukraine 
because in addition to the constitutional right to participation in public governance, 
citizens have an actual mechanism for exercising this right” (Denisenko 2004: 26). But, 
at the same time, the procedures of obtaining information about issues of public concern 
are not precisely stated, so the question arises whether citizens can realize their right to 
inﬂuence the public bodies concerning ﬁscal issues. This is especially true for budgetary 
issues at the local level.
7C Information
In general, the access to information on educational budgets is quite limited. The data 
on the school ﬁscal performance is collected only on the rayon level. The Ministry of 
Education does not collect and generalize the data because it is not involved in the 
budgeting process.
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The rayon education department of the local state administration has access to data 
because it is mainly concerned with economic and ﬁscal issues related to secondary 
education. Usually the ﬁscal data is collected on an annual basis with no special reﬂec-
tion to the cost-eﬃciency and quality of services.
The data on school budget execution concerning the part granted by the local 
government and rayon educational department is quite reliable. But there exists no 
reliable information concerning oﬀ-budget funding—most of such activities are done 
in an unoﬃcial way. According to estimates, up to 15 percent of school budgets belong 
to informal transactions. Schools are motivated to hide and not to report oﬀ-budget 
activities in order to avoid paying taxes or being subjected to control from the State 
Control and Revision Service.
There are possibilities to access data on budget plans (estimates) and their execution 
in rayons, but usually the rayon educational department reports a 100 percent match 
between these numbers. Some mismatch could occur only in case if there was a rayon 
budget sequester. But this relates only to so-called “non-secured” budget items (the 
secured ones are teacher salaries, board, and heating).
7D Accountability
Since school establishments in Ukraine do not have separate budgets (they have only 
cost estimates) relying in ﬁscal issues on the rayon authorities (ﬁnancial departments of 
the local state administration), they are mostly accountable to superior bodies, not to 
the local community. This creates severe problems both with the content of education 
(it usually does not take into account the local demand for special qualiﬁcations of the 
school graduates) and with cost eﬃciency. Schools do not care much about eﬃciency 
because they must spend the whole amount they are granted by the authorities.
Rayon educational authorities belong to local state administration and are also ac-
countable to the superior administrative body. Rayon councils do not have executive 
bodies and are not in position to overview the performance of educational entities. 
Although in some localities local councils try to assist in secondary education according 
to legislation, they are prohibited to contribute to school funding directly. All of this 
accounts for the low accountability of educational administration to the ﬁnal consum-
ers of educational services.
The Ministry of Education is indeed not accountable for the spending of public 
funds because the funding occurs through local ﬁnancial departments of the Ministry 
of Finance. 
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Making Public Finance Public traces the development of fiscal transparency and accountability 
in the field of public finance in three post-communist European states yet to qualify for 
membership in the secure and prosperous borders of the European Union: Croatia, Macedonia, 
and Ukraine. 
These case studies focus not on transparency at the national level as many studies have in 
the past, but seek the answers to essential questions that require immediate redress: how can 
local governments and their constituents in these countries cooperate to make local budgets 
understandable and accountable to the general public; how can national legislation be amended 
to enshrine the principles of accountability in law; and how can citizens arm themselves with the 
skills and tools necessary to ensure the efficacy and transparency of local government budgets 
at risk from corruption, mismanagement, and closed decision-making. 
In this groundbreaking and fascinating study, LGI’s Subnational Budget Watch Fellows have 
taken the lead in recommending the steps to take, steps extremely relevant to countries across 
the region and of particular use to nongovernmental organizations, academics, think tanks, 
advocates, and concerned citizens who want to participate in and decide about public spending 
in their communities. 
After well over a decade of higher priorities in these transition states, it is time to reprioritize the 
agenda and look for the improvements that will guarantee better fiscal governance at the local 
level if both democratization and decentralization are to succeed. 
This volume is a continuation of LGI’s Fellowship studies, designed to encourage and develop 
the research and advocacy role of Fellows selected from around the region. 
